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Speech and Spatial Tactics
Timothy Zick *
As the Supreme Court has observed on many occasions, "First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive." 1 This is so in the
quite literal sense that the exercise of expressive rights requires adequate
physical space. Given its primacy, it is remarkable how little attention has
been given to the concept of "place" in First Amendment doctrine and
theory.
Place has always occupied the background rather than the
foreground in free speech jurisprudence. It has been treated as a locale for
events, a marker for expressive rules and procedures, an inert container of
speakers and speech, a thing, a res. Free speech jurisprudence treats place
categorically, defining expressive rights in terms of the character of the
property or forum involved. It is far more concerned with questions of
"what" speech is being regulated and "why" than with questions of "where"
speech occurs or how speech and spatiality are connected.
It is a serious mistake to view place as merely an inert container or a
backdrop for expressive scenes. Place can be a powerful weapon of social
and political control. Today speech, including core political speech, is being
disciplined, controlled, and even suppressed through a variety of spatial
techniques. Consider the following recent examples:
the free speech cage, an architecture of mesh fabric, coiled razor wire,
chain-link fences, and jersey barriers, constructed to contain
protesters at the 2004 Democratic National Convention;2
the "steel cocoon" that emerged within the District of Columbia prior to
the 2005 presidential inauguration, 3 and the confinement of

* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to thank Chris
Borgen, Elaine Chiu, Paul Kirgis, Miehael Perino, Brian Tamanaha, Nelson Tebbe, Robert Tsai,
Robert Vischer, and David Zaring for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
I. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963) (emphasis added).
2. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66-67 (D. Mass. 2004), affd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004);
Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Deplores but OK's Site for Protesters, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 2004, at
AI.
3. See David Johnston & Michael Janofsky, A Steel Cocoon Is Woven for the Capital's Big
Party, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at Al6 (stating that, in the period leading up to President Bush's
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protesters to spaces behind bleachers and fenced-in areas more than
100 feet from the inauguration parade route; 4
the 25 block "restricted zone" that prohibited all protests near the 1999
World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle; 5
the 1/2 block "frozen zone" or "bubble" used to shield New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg from union members protesting at the
2004 Republican National Convention; 6
the use of metal barricades, or "pens," to confine and control those
protesting the Iraq War; 7
statutory and injunctive "free speech" and "speech-free" zones erected
around abortion clinics and various other public accommodations; 8
campus "free speech zones" that confine First Amendment activity to
narrowly circumscribed places; 9 and
recent laws in several states establishing protest zones for antiwar speech
near funerals. 10

inauguration, Washington D.C. "seemed to disappear behind curtains of steel security fences and
concrete barriers").
4. !d.; Firsi Lady Defends Inaugural Celebration, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005,
available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/0 II 15/Worldandnation!First_lady_defends _in.shtml
("The park service also has issued A.N.S.W.E.R. permits for protesters to stand in nine other
smaller locations along Pennsylvania Ave. But the group says most of those areas are tiny pockets
behind bleachers or in fenced-in areas more than 100 feet from the parade route.").
5. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing Seattle's
creation of the restricted zone and noting testimony that its purpose was "to exclude protestors"); id.
at 1167 (Paez, J., concurring and dissenting) (observing that the restricted zone covered "25 square
blocks of downtown Seattle"); see also Countdown to Chaos in Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5,
1999, at Bl (relating that, on the third day of"WTO week," Seattle police announced that protests
were prohibited within a "new restricted zone").
6. See Julia Preston, Court Backs Police Department in Curbs on Labor Tactics, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2004, at B7 (reporting unions' unsuccessful challenges to "barricades, metal pens, and
'frozen zones"' that would restrain protesters who wanted to follow Bloomberg during the 2004
Republican National Convention).
7. See, e.g., Corey Dade, Election 2004: Democratic Show Set to Go; Protestors March, but
Labor Feuds Settled, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 26, 2004, at AI (reporting that protesters attending
the Democratic National Convention, who "were demonstrating against Democratic acquiescence in
the Iraq war," objected to "the 'pen' police ha[dl erected to contain demonstrations").
8. See, e.g., New York ex rei. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat' I, 273 F.3d I84, 203-10 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that a preliminary injunction creating more extensive "buffer zones" at two abortion
clinics in the Western District of New York violated protestors' free speech rights); Ex parte Tucci,
859 S.W.2d I, 6-7 (Tex. 1993) (holding that a temporary restraining order's provision for a IOOfoot speech-free zone surrounding a Planned Parenthood facility violates article I, section 8 of the
Texas Constitution).
9. See Thomas J. Davis, Note, Assessing Constitutional Challenges to University Free Speech
Zones Under Public Forum Doctrine, 79 IND. L.J. 267, 267-68 (2004) (describing occasions at
various university campuses when students were arrested for protesting outside of designated free
speech zones).
10. Associated Press, Legislators Propose Bills Barring Protests at Funerals, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, Nov. I4, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=l6064
(describing recent legislation in Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Tennessee).
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Under current First Amendment doctrine, restrictions on the place
where expression may occur are routinely upheld. 11 The First Amendment
nominally requires that these sorts of restrictions, like content-neutral
restrictions on the time and manner of expression, satisfy an "intermediate"
level of scrutiny. 12 But in truth this standard is little more than a weak strain
of rationality review. 13 Courts generally tend to view spatial restrictions as
unrelated to expressive content. They are treated as inarguably rational
means of serving governmental interests such as maintaining order and
security. 14 And, indeed, some such regulations are necessary to preserve a
minimal degree of order. Parade routes, for instance, must sometimes be
altered to account for such realities as traffic and pedestrian flow. The First
Amendment is not a license to speak wherever one pleases. But this basic
principle does not afford the state plenary authority to suppress speech on
matters of political and social import by significantly displacing or confining
it. Purportedly neutral restrictions on place can and do cancel expressive and
associative rights. One need look no further than the aforementioned Boston
speech cage for affirmation of this. 15
This Article does not dispute that the state must sometimes control the
place of expression. Space, after all, is a limited resource. My right to speak
in a certain place often will impact others' enjoyment of that place. The
constitutional doctrine of place initially sought to deal with just this sort of
rudimentary conflict. 16 It held that the state could deny a speaker the ability

II. See NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1211 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that, in
order to protect the "concept of a public forum where some or all citizens have a right to speak, the
Court has permitted government to place certain restrictions on this right"); Katharine McCarthy,
Note, Conant v. Walters: A Misapplication of Free Speech Rights in the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 56 ME. L. REv. 447, 460 (2004) ("In fact, limitations on the manner, time and place of
expression are generally upheld if the restrictions serve a significant government interest and if the
restrictions themselves do not alter the message, ideas, or content of expression.").
12. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976) (noting that time, place, and manner restrictions are valid if, in addition to being
')ustified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, ... they serve a significant
governmental interest, and ... they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information"); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y ofN.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
175-76 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that intermediate scrutiny "applies to
content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions on speech in public forums").
13. Traditionally, the rational basis test requires only that state action "be permissible,
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and not impose an irrational burden on
individuals." Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 322 (2d Cir. 2003).
14. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (holding that the governmental interest in
protecting the public from harassment justified a "bubble zone" around a health care facility).
15. See Saltzman, supra note 2, at AI (relating that, leading up to the 2004 Democratic
National Convention in Boston, "several activists insisted that they [were] so disgusted with the
designated protest zone that they ha[ d] no intention of using it").
16. See REDLICH ET AL., supra note II, at 1211 ("[l]f a number of speakers want to use the
same public forum at the same time, they will drown each other out and no speaker could convey
her particular message. Thus, ... the Court has permitted government to place certain restrictions
on this right [to speak].").
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to express herself in the middle of a busy intersection. 17 But the sorts of
cages, zones, and pens that have appeared of late involve an altogether
different strain of spatial restriction. Here the state has moved from
regulating place to actually, in some cases, creating places for the express
purpose of controlling and disciplining protest and dissent. This sort of
spatial sophistication is a recent phenomenon. It represents a new generation
of spatial regulations. Governments have learned to manipulate geography in
a manner that now seriously threatens basic First Amendment principles.
This is a substantial extension of the principle that the state may regulate the
time, place, and manner of expressive activity. It is an extension that
deserves far more scholarly and judicial attention than it has received.
The law can be a blunt instrument for assessing a concept as complex as
place. To assist in highlighting the significance of place to expressive and
associative rights and to put the recent spatial trend in context, this Article
borrows from the work of scholars who have for many years been actively
In disciplines such as
engaged in the systematic study of place.
anthropology, sociology, and philosophy, the techniques of concern in this
Article are sometimes referred to as "spatial tactics." 18 Spatial tactics
represent the ''use of space as a strategy and/or technique of power and social
control." 19 When scholars in these various fields study spatial tactics, they
examine the architectures of places such as prisons, planned towns, gated
communities, and tourist villages. 20 The design of these places is purposeful;
it is specifically intended to control environments, activities, even entire
populations.
Similarly, spatial tactics are giving rise to places that are intended to
control expression. This Article will refer to cages, zones, and pens as
"tactical places." Tactical places impact expressive and associative rights in
a variety of ways. By design, these places mute and even suppress messages,
depress participation in social and political protests, and send negative
signals to those on the outside regarding those confined within. Social and
political movements often require disruption and a degree of confrontation

17. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) ("One would not be justified in
ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he ... sought by that means to direct public attention
to an announcement of his opinions.").
18. See Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga, Locating Culture, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE I, 30--32 (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zilli.iga
eds., 2003) (discussing spatial tactics).
19. /d. at 30 (noting "the way space is used to obscure" power relations and distributions).
20. See, e.g., Miehael Herzfeld, After Authenticity at an American Heritage Site, in THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 370 (examining a
tourist village); Setha M. Low, The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of
Urban Fear, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18,
at 387 (discussing gated communities); Paul Rabinow, Ordonnance, Discipline, Regulation: Some
Reflections on Urbanism, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE,
supra note 18, at 353 (exploring disciplinary space).
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with authority in order to be even marginally effective. 21 Protests in tactical
places are docile; they are tightly scripted and ineffectual imitations of past
social and political movements. In one sense, the very purpose of agitation
and protest is to contest the status quo, to disrupt it. Passively filing into
cages, zones, and other tactical places is an utter capitulation to that status
quo. The spatial tactics examined in this Article, the ones that produce
tactical places, represent a movement toward a perfect geometry of control
over just the sort of speech the First Amendment ought to protect-that
which challenges authority, offends sensibilities, or otherwise "disturb[s] the
complacent." 22 Geometric precision is being utilized to marginalize dissent,
to capture and confine it. Freedom (of speech) is being measured in feet,
partitioned based upon Euclidean principles.
Two societal phenomena seem to have moved us in this direction. The
events of September 11, 200 1, have created a climate in which dissent and
divisive expression, and speakers associated with this sort of activity, are
viewed as dangerous. 23 The government has moved aggressively to
segregate what it sees as potentially threatening dissension and agitation. 24
In addition, the "culture wars" have heightened sensitivity to certain strains
of particularly disturbing and upsetting speech, such as pro-life protests and
"hate speech."25 Governments have begun to rely on place as a means of

21. See generally Dieter Rucht, The Changing Role of Political Protest Movements, W. EUR.
POL., Oct. 2003, at 153, 171 ("Following the student revolts of the 1960s, left-libertarians have
helped to create a more active, more liberal, more democratic and more participatory political
culture in Germany .... [W]ithout the tenacious left-libertarian mobilisation it has experienced,
Germany would most likely retain much more of the authoritarian heritage that characterised the
Adenauer era."); Michael Specter, The Extremist: The Woman Behind the Most SuccessfUl Radical
Group in America, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 2003, at 52 (illustrating, through the example of People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, how social movements use radicalism that alienates the
mainstream in order to achieve moderate progress).
22. Martinv.CityofStruthers,319U.S.I41, 143(1943).
23. See, e.g., Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to Door, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, at I (noting that federal authorities have been questioning Americans
who criticize the government, the President, or the war on terrorism); see also AM. CML LIBERTIES
UNION, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: DISSENT IN POST-9/11 AMERICA (May 2003),
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/dissent_report.pdf (describing restrietions on mass protests and
rallies, symbolic expression, and other expressions of dissent in the period following September II,
2001).
24. This phenomenon is not limited to governments. Private employers and other private
actors, unconstrained by First Amendment concerns, have suppressed expression in the spaces
under their control as well. See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private
Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 10 I, I 03-{)4 (2004) (noting the trend of nongovernmental suppression of speech and arguing
that the First Amendment should reach some such private acts).
25. See Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHL-KENT L.
REV. 531, 532-33 (2003) ("In the ongoing culture wars, few battlegrounds are more contested than
freedom of expression. In recent decades, the First Amendment has been at the heart of
controversies over antiwar demonstrations, pornography, hate speech, flag burning, abortion
counseling, anti-abortion protests, and the National Endowment for the Arts."); cf Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of choosing sides in a
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controlling this sort of speech. There are tactical reasons for such reliance on
place as a speech-control mechanism. As mentioned, the "intermediate"
scrutiny applied to place regulations is quite forgiving and flexible. It has
become even more so in light of heightened security concerns. More
generally, place is perceived as a "neutral" mass capable of effecting a fair
and value-free segmentation of speakers.
Courts and scholars are responsible for this presumption of spatial
neutrality. Place in general, and the use of spatial tactics in particular, have
not received concentrated attention from First Amendment scholars. There
are, of course, many critiques of the Supreme Court's "public forum"
doctrine, which categorizes places as either open or closed to expression"public" or "nonpublic" forums in the Court's parlance? 6 These critiques are
well deserved, not least because public forum doctrine makes it possible for
the state to manipulate place. But there is a larger failure in the doctrine of
place. Place as a concept has not been considered worthy of independent
scholarly analysis. Nor has it been deemed worthy of serious judicial
thought. As others have noted, the Court has never provided much in the
way of any theoretical justification for its public forum doctrine, 27 and it
continues to treat place restrictions as if they raise no serious First
Amendment issues. Indeed, place is currently so undervalued that scholars,
along with the rest of the public, seemed barely to notice when courts
sanctioned the construction of the speech cage at the Democratic National
Convention in Boston? 8 Even this tactical place, an architecture the district
court described as an "internment camp" and an "affront to the role of free
expression,"29 was permitted to stand under the doctrine of place. 30

"culture war" by striking down a state law that prohibited ordinances designed to protect
homosexuals).
26. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP.
CT. REv. I, 26-27 (arguing that rather than simply banning speech in a forum, courts should reach a
mutually satisfactory arrangement that accommodates both free speech interests and the interests in
the forum's other uses, such as a street's travel use); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral
Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 309-11 (1999) (asserting that the
Supreme Court has never adequately addressed the "public forum problem" and suggesting that the
ideal solution rests in adopting a free speech doctrine analogous to common law nuisance
principles); Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 739,
741-42 (1991) (discussing widespread criticism of the public forum doctrine for tending to rely on
easy labels rather than substantive analysis of First Amendment issues).
27. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1760--64 (1987) (arguing that the Court relies on tradition
for its public forum doctrine and that even this is "unfounded and incomplete").
28. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61,
74-76 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
2004) (discussing the constitutionality of the "demonstration zone" at the 2004 Democratic National
Convention).
29. /d. at 74-75.
30. See id. at 76 ("[G]iven the constraints present at the location and the [Boston Police
Departmentl's reasonable safety concerns, there is no injunctive relief that I could fashion that
would vindicate plaintiffs' First Amendment rights without causing quite siguificant harm to the
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The spatial tactics phenomenon strongly hints that something is
seriously amiss in the doctrinal and theoretical treatment of place. Perhaps in
an era of rapid technological advances, many view concern over protesters'
access to streets, sidewalks, and other public venues as quaint or
unnecessary. Perhaps the presumed neutrality of place accounts for this
general complacency. Or perhaps, in the collective mind, security of place
now simply outweighs liberty of place. Whatever the reason for the societal
(and this, as will become clear, most certainly includes judicial)
complacence, this kind of manipulation of place should give us pause. We
are rightly proud of our country's expressive tradition, including its tolerance
of public displays of dissent. But while here, in the United States, spatial
tactics are neutering political dissent, protesters in countries deemed far less
friendly to dissent are discovering the power that comes with the ability to
access, even commandeer, public spaces. 31
This Article advocates a spatial tum in First Amendment jurisprudence.
The tum has two basic components.
First, this Article seeks to
reconceptualize place, to get us thinking about the idea of place in a
fundamentally different way. Current judicial thinking's permissive stance
toward place can be traced to the concept that place is nothing more than
property, or res. This Article aims to correct that misconception of place, to
demonstrate that speech and spatiality are critically related and intersect in a
variety of ways that a conception of place-as-res cannot appreciate. The rise
of tactical places demonstrates that res is an insufficient concept for place.
Second, the spatial tum entails a reexamination of the standards currently
applied in reviewing spatial tactics and modem tactical places. In general,
the proposal is to sharpen the so-called intermediate standard that applies to
spatial restrictions such that a knowledgeably skeptical form of scrutiny is
applied when the state uses spatial tactics. The spatial tum's two elements
are thus related. Doctrinal changes-including sharpening the so-called
intermediate standard-will materialize only if and when courts more fully
understand the dynamic relationship between speech and spatiality,
dispensing with current conceptions of place as merely res.
Part I describes four recent examples of spatial tactics in expressive
contexts: the utilization of pens, cages, and other architectural tactics to
(dis)place political dissent; statutory and injunctive "buffer zones" used to

City, the delegates, and the public interest .... "); see also Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378
F.3d 8, 12-14 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that it was "a close and difficult case" but finding reasonable
the district court's conclusion that the demonstration zone satisfied the "intermediate scrutiny" of
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in public fora), aff'g Coal. to Protest the Democratic
Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004).
31. See Supara Janchitfah, Landless Find Strength in Numbers: A Network ofLandless Farmers
Is Challenging the Government's Inaction on Long-Promised Land Reform, BANGKOK POST, Feb.
15, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 9936756 (reporting on increased protests by poor rural farmers
in southern Thailand who are seeking to convince the Thai government to distribute public land
with expired leases to the poor).
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control expression at abortion clinics; campus "free speech zones"; and the
use of "free speech" and "speech-free" zones at various other public
accommodations. When viewed in isolation, some of these examples may
not seem seriously troubling. But when properly considered collectively, as
part of a trend, it is apparent that these geometries are fundamentally altering
the manner in which protest and dissent are conveyed in public places.
Spatial tactics are carefully arranging the separation of speakers and listeners.
They are facilitating listener avoidance of speech that offends and irritates.
To explain why spatial tactics are currently viewed with little skepticism
or alarm, Part II situates place in First Amendment jurisprudence. Spatial
tactics are currently viewed as neutral because that is generally how courts
and commentators view place itself-as an inert, neutral element of the
expressive background. Through the nonsystematic inventions of the public
forum and "time, place, and manner" doctrines, place ultimately became
mere res. The primary assumptions underlying the place-as-res concept are
that speech and spatiality are entirely separate and distinct, that place is
merely a background or context for expression, and that place is
presumptively partitioned without regard to the content of expression.
These assumptions are all false. Their persistence is not merely a
function of the infirmities, well articulated by others, of the Court's public
forum doctrine. The cause runs deeper than this, to the absence of any real
conceptual understanding of place at all. To understand why spatial tactics
and their associated tactical places are constitutionally troubling, place must
be reconceptualized. Drawing on the work of scholars of place from a
variety of other disciplines, including geography, sociology, anthropology,
and philosophy, Part III offers a different theoretical perspective on place. It
proposes an interdisciplinary concept, "expressive place," that views place as
variable rather than merely binary; primary rather than secondary to
expression; constructed or created rather than objectively given; and dynamic
rather than inert. Place, in other words, is not merely an inert res. It is an
expression of power, message, and meaning. Speakers and listeners do not
merely occupy places; they connect with and speak through them.
Finally, Part IV returns to spatial tactics and tactical places, examining
them in light of place's conceptual repositioning. Viewing spatial tactics
through the conceptual lens of expressive place, Part IV contends that spatial
tactics deserve a far more faithful application of the intermediate standard of
review articulated by the Court. There are several doctrinal implications
here. First, at the outset, courts should actively question the premise that
tactical places are neutral with regard to subject matter and viewpoint. This
Article suggests that for many reasons it is more faithful to First Amendment
principles to treat such places as at least "content-correlated," a phrase some
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on the Court have applied to zoning restrictions for adult entertainment. 32
Although this does not lead to strict judicial scrutiny, it can and should lead
to much sharper judicial scrutiny of spatial tactics than current practice
entails. This means, in tum, that the state should bear the burden of
justifying the use of spatial tactics by providing specific evidence of
supposed threats to community, order, or safety. The state should be
required, when it constructs tactical places, to tailor lines that facilitate
speaker access to potential listeners and that restrict only as much expression
as is truly necessary to serve the state's demonstrated purposes. Finally,
courts should view with far greater skepticism than they currently do the
argument that spatial tactics leave open ample and adequate alternative space
for expressive activity. They should, in short, take far more seriously the
notion that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised elsewhere."33
I.

Spatial Tactics

This Part describes the modem-day spatial tactics and tactical places
with which this Article is concerned. Not all spatial restrictions are or should
be constitutionally suspect. A restriction on where signs or banners may be
placed, for example, does not ordinarily raise substantial constitutional
questions. Under prevailing standards, so long as such restrictions are
minimally tailored and leave open ample alternative outlets for the speaker to
communicate his or her message, the state may regulate place to serve
aesthetic or other important public interests. 34 When, however, the state uses
geometric and other spatial techniques to physically construct cages, zones,
pens, and other architectures to control and discipline expression, basic First
Amendment principles are threatened in a more direct and serious manner.
The spatial tactics of the sort described below should be viewed with greater
skepticism than run mine place restrictions that minimally burden expression.
A. The (Dis)placing of Political Protest
The most noticeable and disturbing recent trend has been the
segmentation of place to control and displace mass protests, demonstrations,
and other political and social agitation. 35 Political dissent has become spatial

32. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 457--60 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (discussing content-correlated zoning restrictions as lower scrutiny alternatives to
content-based regulations).
33. Schneiderv. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
34. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that location
restrictions on protests "are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information").
35. As the district court in the case involving the free speech cage at the 2004 Democratic
National Convention noted, the use of demonstration zones "is a relatively recent innovation," one
that "apparently [became] routine at large political events ever since the 1999 World Trade
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tactics' principal casualty. 36 Indeed, the act of mounting a political protest
has been fundamentally altered by spatial tactics.
Within existing First Amendment doctrine, the government has a variety
of spatial tactics at its disposal to control mass movements and expressions
of public dissent. It can, so long as there are clear and objective standards,
require speakers and demonstrators to obtain permits prior to events. 37 It can
alter parade and demonstration routes to ensure that order is maintained. 38
These are, at least in a broad sense, spatial tactics. But again, the state is
generally permitted to use these sorts of restrictions, so long as there is no
proof that the government is manipulating parade routes to suppress a
particular message 39 or exercising "unfettered discretion" in licensing access
to places. 40
But governments have begun to implement more specific control
mechanisms with regard to protests and other mass events. A more local and
more precise geometry of place has begun to fashion an expressive
topography that limits, confines, and controls protest and dissent. Just as
military commanders partition and segment their battlefields, governments
have begun to partition and segment expressive venues. 41 The state, through

Organization meeting in Seattle." Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'/ Convention, 327 F. Supp.
2d at 73. For a discussion of some of the recent tactics officials have used to control protests, see
Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment Protection of Special
Places, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 53, 53-61 (2004).
36. Ken Paulson, Marches at a Standstill: The New Limits on Assembly, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER, Feb. 23, 2003, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=6340
("America's cities appear increasingly reluctant to allow protest marches, citing security and cost
concerns.").
37. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,570-76 (1941) (affirming the constitutionality of
a state statute "prohibiting a 'parade or procession' upon a public street without a special license").
38. See id. at 574 ("The authority of a municipality to impose regulations ... in the use of
public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the
means of safe-guarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need."); cf United
for Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that
New York City's denial of the plaintiff's application for a permit to march past the United Nations
building did not violate the First Amendment because of the "siguificant governmental interest" in
"the peace and security of the United Nations Headquarters and the U.S. Mission" and because the
City had "offered as an alternative a stationary rally"), ajJ'd, 323 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003).
39. Cf United for Peace & Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (noting the absence of evidence that
New York City's restriction on the plaintiff's ability to march past the United Nations building was
"being applied or justified in any way because of the anti-war message of the marchers").
40. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 (affirming the constitutionality of a statute that required a license
for parades, noting the state court's determination that "the licensing board was not vested with
arbitrary power or an unfettered discretion"); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516
(1939) (agreeing with the invalidation of an ordinance that authorized an official to deny permits
based only on the official's "mere opinion" because the ordinance could "be made the instrument of
arbitrary suppression of free expression ... ").
41. Although this phenomenon has become more and more common, the practice is not entirely
new. See, e.g., Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1980)
(upholding the use of a "bull pen," in which only twelve persons would be permitted to
demonstrate, outside the Russian Mission in New York City).
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spatial tactics, is actively creating distinct, tactical places for expressive
activity. Spatial tactics are giving rise to what we might consider particular
architectures of place. As we shall see, the battlefield analogy is particularly
apt, for these architectures are generally being constructed in the name of
post-September 11 security.
The tactical displacement of demonstrators and demonstrations is a
phenomenon largely of the past decade or so and has become particularly
prevalent in the past few years. "Zoning" of some sort or another has been
applied to individual public officials, presidential inaugurations, and major
conventions alike. For example, President Bush has been shielded from
numerous organized protests during his campaigns and presidency. 42 The
Secret Service visited locations ahead of time and established "free speech
zones" or "protest zones" where those opposed to the President's policies
were effectively quarantined. 43 Supporters of the President, on the other
hand, were generally permitted much closer access to the candidate. 44 The
zones were effective at keeping protesters at a substantial distance from the
President. 45 They also separated protesters from the media covering the
campaign. 46 At least on some occasions, media personnel were not permitted
inside the protest zones, and protesters were confined to them once inside. 47
Despite their names, the "protest zones" and "free speech zones"
established during President Bush's 2004 campaign were hardly speechfacilitative. They were not designed to be such. In Pittsburgh, for example,
local police established a "designated free speech zone" on a baseball field

42. See James Bovard,
"Free-Speech Zone": The Administration Quarantines
Dissent,
AM.
CONSERVATIVE,
Dec.
15,
2003,
available
at
http://www.amconmag.com/2003/12_15 _ 03/feature.html (describing how the Secret Service
"routinely succeed[s] in keeping protesters out of presidential sight"); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, supra note 23, at 11-13 (describing use of protest zones at campaign events); Jonathan M.
Katz, Thou Dost Protest Too Much, SLATE, Sept. 24, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2107012/
(describing protester's conviction for refusing to demonstrate in the designated "free speech zone").
43. Bovard, supra note 42. Federal law prohibits entry into any designated "posted, cordoned
off, or otherwise restricted area" where the President "is or will be temporarily visiting[.]" 18
U.S.C. 1752(a)(l)(ii). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1752(d)(2) (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury "to prescribe regulations governing ingress or egress to such buildings and grounds and to
posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted areas where the President or other person protected by
the Secret Service is or will be temporarily visiting"); United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 309
(4th Cir. 2005) (upholding the conviction of a campaign event protester based on his 1presence in a
restricted presidential area).
44. This precise control of space and place was a hallmark of the Bush campaign. For example,
at certain campaign events only those who were willing to sign a pledge of support for the President
were permitted inside the campaign venue. G. Jeffrey MacDonald, A Close Eye-And Tight GripOn Campaign Protestors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 27, 2004, at II, available at
http://www .csmonitor.com/2004/0927/p II s02-ussc.html.
45. Bovard, supra note 42.
46. /d. (stating that the protest zones set up by the Secret Service ahead of President Bush's
visits often kept protesters "outside the view of media covering the event").
47. See id. (relating one protester's description of a protest zone's conditions during a 2003 visit
by President Bush).
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surrounded by a chain-link fence. 48 The site was a third of a mile from the
President's scheduled speech location. 49 These zones were not suggested
venues for expression and protest; they were intended to be and were utilized
as somewhat coercive architectures of control. 5° Several protesters were in
fact arrested for refusing to utilize these specially designated spaces. 5 1
Speech at large campaign events, specifically national political
conventions, has been hampered by tactical zones of greater scale. During
the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, -for example,
government officials designated a "secured zone" around the stadium where
the convention was to take place. 52 The zone covered-that is it cordoned
off-approximately 185 acres of land surrounding the convention site, 53 and
it was in effect 24 hours a day. 54 Ostensibly to accommoda,te expressive
interests, officials designated an "Official Demonstration" area for protesters
within this secured zone. 55 The zone effectively kept the protesters 260 yards
from any participating delegate. 56 A district court enjoined the use of this
zone, not because it was intended to suppress expression, but rather because
its dimensions were so disproportionate to the state's interests as to be
deemed insufficiently tailored even under the relatively lenient tailoring
requirement applied to spatial regulations. 57
One of the unique and, in terms of expressive freedoms, disturbing
aspects of geometric techniques like zoning is that the geometry or physics
can be refined, in effect making it a more perfect means of control. The
"experts," which in the context of political conventions are generally law
enforcement officials, essentially learn from prior mistakes. They devise
new and more restrictive architectures.
Thus, at the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, the
government once again resorted to zoning to contain anticipated

48. Dave Lindorff, Keeping Dissent Invisible: How the Secret Service and the White House
Keep Protestors Safely out of Bush's Sight-And off TV, SALON, Oct. 16, 2003,
http://www.salon.com/news/featurc/2003/ I0/ 16/secret_service/index.html.
49. Bovard, supra note 42.
50. See Lindorff, supra note 48 (likening the design of a free speech area to that of a
concentration camp).
51. Id; see also Katz, supra note 42.
52. Serv. Employee lnt'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968-69 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
53. Jd at 971.
54. Jd
55. Jd at 969.
56. Jd at 972.
57. Jd at 974-75. Other similarly situated security zones have been struck down as
unconstitutional for the same reason. See, e.g., United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th
Cir. 1999) (invalidating a 175-foot "safety zone"); Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d
1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990) (invalidating a 75-yard "safety zone" between demonstrators and their
intended audience).
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demonstrators. 58 As in Los Angeles in 2000, there were two zones in Boston,
a "hard security zone," which comprised the convention center and
immediately adjacent areas, and a "soft security zone," which encompassed
areas further removed from the convention site. 59
The government constructed a "designated demonstration zone" (DZ)
within the soft security zone. 60 The DZ was a "roughly rectangular space of
approximately 26,000 to 28,000 square feet-very approximately 300 feet by
90 feet." 61 The "overall impression created by the DZ," the court noted, was
that of "an internment camp."62 The district court's description of the DZ
merits emphasis:
Most-at least two-thirds-of the DZ lies under unused Green Line
tracks. The tracks create a space redolent of the sensibility conveyed
in Piranesi's etchings published as Fanciful Images of Prisons. It is a
grim, mean, and oppressive space whose ominous roof is supported by
a forest of girders that obstruct sight lines throughout as the tracks
slope downwards towards the southern end.
The DZ is surrounded by two rows of concrete jersey barriers. Atop
each of the jersey barriers is an eight foot high chain link fence. A
tightly woven mesh fabric, designed to prevent liquids and objects
from being thrown through the fenee, covers the outer fence, limiting
but not eliminating visibility. From the top of the outer fence to the
train tracks overhead, at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees
to horizontal, is a looser mesh netting, designed to prevent objects
from being thrown at the delegates.
On the overhead Green Line tracks themselves is looped razor wire,
designed to prevent persons from climbing onto the tracks where
armed police and National Guardsman [sic] will be located. 63
Other "design elements" of this oppressive architecture limited the
number of protesters to no more than 1,000 (despite the fact that the city had
originally assured that at least 4,000 could be accommodated); severely
restricted the use of signs, posters, and other visual material; and prohibited

58. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61, 75 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F)d 8 (1st Cir.
2004), for the district court's·discussion of the reasonableness, in consideration of past incidents like
those at the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, of certain characteristics of the
Boston "demonstration zone." For example, the court noted that the demonstration zone's double
fence was "reasonable in light of past experience in which demonstrators have pushed over a single
fence." /d.
59. Id. at 65.
60. /d. at 66.
61. /d.
62. /d. at 74.
63. /d. at 67. The court prefaced its account by noting that "[a] written description cannot
convey the ambience of the DZ site as experienced during the view." /d.
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the passing of leaflets to delegates, even those who approached the DZ. 64
The space, the district court said, "convey[ed] the symbolic sense of a
holding pen where potentially dangerous persons are separated from
others."65
Nevertheless, following traditional First Amendment doctrine the
district court upheld the DZ cage as a content-neutral regulation of the place
of expression. 66 This "internment camp," which the district court referred to
as a "symbolic affront to the role of free expression," was held to be entirely
consistent with First Amendment standards relating to place. 67 This was so,
the court said, for two reasons. First, the court concluded that there was no
specific evidence that the government had intentionally constructed the DZ
in order to suppress expression. 68 Second, the court relied upon "past
experience" at other demonstrations, by which the court meant incidents of
violent protest, to conclude that a substantial safety threat was present at this
event as well. 69 The district judge also opined that "given the constraints of
time, geography, and safety, I cannot say that the design itself is not narrowly
tailored in light of other opportunities for communication available under the
larger security plan." 70 This was so despite the fact that the DZ was "the
only available location providing a direct interface between demonstrators
and the area where delegates ... entered and left" the convention site. 71
The First Circuit affirmed. 72 In what can only be characterized as
judicial understatement, the court acknowledged that the DZ's enclosed
space was "far from a perfect solution." 73 Still, the court upheld the spatial
tactic. It held that the DZ satisfied the First Amendment's intermediate
scrutiny standard for content-neutral regulations of place. 74 The First Circuit
reasoned that the DZ was "plainly content-neutral and there can be no
doubting the substantial government interest in the maintenance of security at
political conventions." 75 The court conceded that there was no "eventspecific threat evidence," but declined to require it to validate the use of the

64. !d. at 67-68.
65. !d. at 74--75 (emphasis added).
66. !d. at 75-76.
67. !d. at 74--75.
68. See id. at 75-76 (treating the DZ as a content-neutral regulation of place); see also Bl(a)ck
Tea Soc'y v .. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that "the challenged security
precautions af.e plainly content-neutral"), aff'g Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v.
City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004).
69. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'/ Convention, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75 & 75 n.2
(declining to rely upon an ex parte submission regarding actual threats and instead concluding that
the DZ was "reasonable in light of past experience").
70. !d. at 75.
71. !d. at 74.
72. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 8.
73. !d. at 11.
74. !d. at 14.
75. !d. at 12.
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DZ. 76 The First Circuit also acknowledged that the DZ "allowed no
opportunity for physical interaction (such as the distribution of leaflets) and
severely curtailed any chance for one-on-one conversation." 77 Further, it
recognized that visual communication, as with signs or posters, was
significantly hampered by the DZ's architectural design. 78 Nevertheless, the
court found that adequate alternative channels of communication existed. lt
emphasized in particular that demonstrators could convey their messages at
such "high profile" events as national political conventions through the mass
media. 79
Ultimately, not a single demonstrator utilized this "holding pen."80 Had
they done so, protesters would have been crowded into the DZ's narrow
confines, unable to utilize visual techniques much less engage in face-to-face
interactions with the convention delegates. They would have been under
constant police surveillance. 81 There was even some concern, voiced by the
district court, that protesters would not be safe in the cage. 82 The DZ, as it
turned out, was a perfect geometry of control. Its architecture was so
restrictive that dissent was entirely suppressed in the one place where it was
most likely to have an impact.
The DZ is only one example of the increasing perfection of geometric
control brought about by spatial tactics. Today, all protest assemblies are
subjected to some sort of spatial tactics. Seattle took the extraordinary step
in 1999 of suspending all assembly within a 25 block area surrounding the
Colorado Springs recently
World Trade Organization conference. 83
established a "security zone" around a hotel at which several defense
ministers were gathered. 84 During George W. Bush's first and second
76. /d. at 13-14.
77. /d. at 13.
78. Id. (noting that the use of signs was "hampered ... by the cramped space and the mesh
screening").
79. /d. at 14 (citing opportunities to communicate via "television, radio, the press, the internet,
and other outlets").
80. See, e.g., John Kifner, Demonstrators Steer Clear of Their Designated Space, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 2004, at P3 ("The designated demonstration area, a dank place under abandoned elevated
tracks, failed its first test Sunday when what will probably be the largest demonstration of the
convention period simply walked right by it.").
81. See James Bovard, Editorial, Protests Pre-empted, BALT. SUN, Aug. 6, 2004, at 13A
(stating that the ambience of the demonstration zone was "accentuated by the police helicopters
patrolling overhead, by the omnipresent National Guardsmen in their camo outfits and by the state
police occasionally prancing around in their black armor suits").
82. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61,
67 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that the City would have to limit the capacity of the DZ because of
safety questions the judge raised while inspecting the site), affd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City
of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
83. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding the restricted
zone as a valid time, place, and manner regulation).
84. See Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, No. Civ.A.04CV00464-RPM,
2005 WL 1769230 (D. Colo. July 25, 2005) (upholding a security zone that closed all public streets
around the hotel).
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inaugurations, protesters were issued permits to demonstrate only in
designated areas or "free speech zones." 85 At the most recent inauguration,
antiwar protesters were given some space along the inauguration parade
route, but they were otherwise limited to "tiny spaces" behind bleachers and
to "fenced-in areas more than 100 feet from the parade route." 86 There was
thick irony in an inauguration devoted to the principles of liberty and
freedom taking place within what journalists described as a "steel cocoon."87
As noted, one of the lessons of the DZ is that zoning techniques can be
made progressively finer and more precise. When it comes to political
dissent, designated speech zones and the building of specific architectures do
not exhaust the government's arsenal of spatial tactics. ln addition to zones
and cages, the government has begun to use more localized architectures and
tactics like pens, protective bubbles, and even nets to control and discipline
dissent and dissenters. 88
The use of metal barricades, or "pens," is a relatively recent law
enforcement spatial tactic. As the name suggests, pens are closed, four-sided
barricades used to contain protesters and essentially render them immobile. 89
The pens are difficult to climb over and impossible to crawl under. 90 Still,
some courts have characterized these structures as speech-facilitative. For
example, one judge described pens as "a practical device used by the police
to protect those actively exercising their rights from those who would prevent
its exercise.'m At a February 2003 demonstration against the Iraq war,

85. See, e.g., Jill Lawrence, Protesters Plan to Turn Their Backs on Bush, USA TODAY, Jan.
17, 2005, at !lA (explaining that authorities expected a similar level of protest to the first
inauguration in which "two of six protest permits went to groups supportive of Bush, the rest to
opponents"); Johanna Neuman, Tamer Protests Expected for Second Inauguration, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2005, at A12 ("During the Bush campaign, protesters were often given permits to demonstrate
only in spaces far from event sites."); Paulson, supra note 36 (noting that during President George
W. Bush's first inauguration "protesters were issued permits to demonstrate only in designated areas
along the parade route").
86. Associated Press, Protesters Get Prime Spot for Inauguration, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER,
Jan.
13,
2005,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
news. aspx ?id= 146 8 I & Search S tring=inaugura tion.
87. See Johnston & Janofsky, supra note 3, at Al6 (describing "curtains of steel security fences
and concrete barriers" erected in Washington, D.C. in anticipation of the inauguration ceremony).
88. See Preston, supra note 6, at B7 (referring to "barricades, metal pens, and 'frozen zones'"
used to shield New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg from protesters during the Republican
National Convention in 2004).
89. See Julia Preston, Searches of Convention Protesters Limited, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at
B4 (discussing the efforts of the New York Civil Liberties Union to force the police to abandon the
use of closed, four-sided pens, "which are set up with metal barriers that are hard to climb over and
impossible to crawl under[,]" to contain the protesters).
90. !d.
91. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing "a barricaded enclosure for
demonstrators and counterdemonstrators"). But see Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ.
9162(RWS), 03 Civ. 9163(RWS), 03 Civ. 9164(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. July
16, 2004) (finding, based on the record, that a law enforcement policy of using pens was not
narrowly tailored).
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police used pens to create block-long, four-sided enclosures. 92 Once these
pens were filled with protesters, those inside were barred from exiting for
any reason. 93 A lawsuit brought prior to the 2004 Republican National
Convention in New York City sought to bar the use of pens. 94 The district
court did not bar the use of pens altogether or subject them to any form of
heightened scrutiny; it merely required that the police policy dating to
February 2003 be altered to provide improved ingress and egress from the
pens. 95
As the discussion of the campaign "free speech zones" above indicates,
the space around public officials has also become far more tightly regulated
in recent years. Presidents, national candidates, and other high-level officials
travel inside security "bubbles" for obvious and understandable safety
reasons. 96 But this spatial tactic is now routinely being used by public
officials of various ranks and stations. To protest the fact that they did not
yet have a labor contract, members of New York City police and firefighter
unions recently attempted to trail Mayor Michael Bloomberg as he attended
the 2004 Republican National Convention. 97 A federal district court upheld
various security measures that the mayor's security detail and local police
enforced against the unions and other protesters, including a half-block
"bubble" or speech-free zone. 98 The court rejected the union members'
request that they be permitted to come within fifteen feet of the mayor to
convey their specific message. 99
Finally, at an even finer level, the government has resorted to more
physical spatial tactics to control dissent. On the final evening of the 2004
Republican National Convention, nearly 1,800 protesters were arrested on
the streets. 100 In addition to pens and other barricades, the police unveiled a
new spatial technique: officers used large orange nets to divide and capture
protesters. 101 Police, for example, were able to thwart a protest mounted by

92. Preston, supra note 89, at B4.
93. !d.
94. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870.
95. !d. at *29.
96. See, e.g., Michael Settle, Bush Fans Flame ofFreedom, HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 21,2005,
at 1 (reporting that former presidents, leading politicians, judges, businessmen, family, and friends
observed the inauguration from inside a security bubble); Wayne Washington, NATO Plan Nears;
Bush Courts Turks, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 2004, at Al (explaining that President Bush's
security bubble kept him well away from protesters at the North American Treaty Organization
summit in 2004); Rick Westhead eta!., Thousands Test Tight Security Bubble, TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 1, 2004, at A03 (describing the security zone around President Bush during a visit to Canada,
which contained thousands of police and Secret Service agents).
97. Preston, supra note 6, at B7.
98. !d.
99. /d.
100. Michael Slackman & Diane Cardwell, Tactics by Police Mute the Protesters, and Their
Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, atAl.
101. /d.
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bicyclists by throwing a net across a public street. 102 Casting nets is not a
finely tailored spatial technique .. As might be expected, authorities snared a
number of innocent bystanders. 103
Beginning from a very sound premise, namely that a degree of order
and safety must be maintained, authorities have effectively controlled and
even suppressed core political dissent by designing and constructing tactical
places for it. Cages, zones, pens, and even nets are the new weapons .of
choice in the clash between security and expressive freedom. Spatial tactics
are fundamentally altering expressive and associative rights in public places.
B. Abortion Clinic "Buffer Zones" and "Bubbles"
The use of spatial tactics is not limited to political demonstrations.
Social and political protest have also been geometrically confined and
restrained in other situations. Indeed, spatial tactics first arose as a response
to demonstrations outside abortion and other public health clinics. In this
context, as in others, government has relied upon spatial tactics to confine
and control speakers who wish to convey upsetting and offensive messages.
Demonstrators at abortion clinics have utilized provocative language,
and sometimes even resorted to violence, to urge patients to reconsider their
decision to have an abortion. 104 Incidents of physical violence or property
destruction are, of course, subject to prosecution under the criminal laws.
Officials have relied instead on prophylactic spatial tactics to defuse the
environment around abortion clinics. Delivery of the protestors' message at
or near these clinics has raised two distinct spatial problems. First, the space
around the clinic must be generally free of obstructions, so that patrons can
gain access to the property. Second, legislators and courts have sought to
provide clinic visitors some minimal "personal space" or privacy as they seek
to visit the clinics. There must be, they have reasoned, some line past which

102. !d.
103. !d. (noting that police mistakes included "the arrest of several innocent bystanders and
nonviolent protesters"). See generally Michael Slackman & Ann Farmer, 25,000 Abortion-Rights
Advocates March to City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A27 (describing the ordeal
encountered by 264 people swept up by police nets, including one innocent bystander who spent
sixteen hours in a holding cell); Greg B. Smith, Lawsuits Likely to Sing Blues over NYPD Tactics,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 4, 2004, at 13 (stating that police officials had yet to address "complaints
that dozens of innocent people were wrongfully arrested as they walked near protests when police
used orange nets to sweep up everyone" during the GOP convention).
104. E.g., Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d I, 7 (Tex. 1993) ("Throughout the nation, peaceful antiabortion picketing has given way to increasing incidents of violence, vandalism and trespass, as
well as blockading of clinic entrances denying women their right to seek reproductive health
services, including abortions."); see, e.g., Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357,
363 (1997) ("Counselors would walk alongside targeted women headed toward the clinics, handing
them literature and talking to them in an attempt to persuade them not to get an abortion.
Unfortunately, if the women continued toward the clinics and did not respond positively to the
counselors, such peaceful efforts at persuasion often devolved into 'in your face' yelling, and
sometimes into pushing, shoving, and grabbing.").
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a protester cannot advance in order to make his case, an embodied space that
ensures free physical movement and psychological repose.
Legislatures and courts have developed two distinct spatial tactics to
address these issues. First, in the early 1990s, "buffer zones" became the
chosen spatial technique for ensuring patients' access to clinic properties. 105
Federal and state legislatures instituted various lines or boundaries to control
the spaces around abortion clinics. 106 Courts fashioned injunctive relief that
also included specific spatial dimensions. 107
Second, to protect patients' privacy and repose, the law developed what
has come to be known as "the bubble." To illustrate, Colorado's law,
enacted in 1993 and upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 108 required protesters to stay
eight feet from anyone entering or leaving an abortion clinic, as long as the
clinic visitor was within l 00 feet of the entrance. 109 The Court characterized
this statute as a content-neutral "regulation of the places where some speech
may occur." 110 . The State's interests in protecting access to the clinics and
women's right to privacy (on the public sidewalks) were deemed sufficiently
important and unrelated to the suppression of any social or political
message. 111 The 100-foot buffer zone, along with an 8-foot embodied
bubble, were considered adequately tailored to serve the State's important
interests. 112
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 113 the Court upheld an injunctive
"speech-free buffer zone" that prohibited all demonstrations within 36 feet of
an abortion clinic. 114 This effectively displaced anti-abortion protesters. For

105. See Nat Hentoff, Protesting Up-Close, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1995, at A21 (noting that
"[ m]unicipal ordinances and court injunctions ... have led to the establishment in a number of cities
of buffer zones around abortion clinics"); see also George Flynn, Permanent Order Limits Abortion
Foes, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1994, at Al3 (describing an injunction that established "permanent
buffer zones against protests at [abortion] clinics and physicians' residences"); Jerry Gray, Bill
Shields Abortion Clinics from Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at B6 (describing an attempt in
New Jersey to pass a law creating a 100-foot buffer zone around healthcare centers).
106. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000) (prohibiting
intentionally injuring, intimidating, or physically interfering with any person seeking to obtain
reproductive health services near a health care facility); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-122(3)
(West 2004) (barring any person within 100 feet of a health care facility, defined to include abortion
clinics, from approaching another person within eight feet of that other person, with the purpose of
passing out a leaflet or engaging in "oral protest").
107. See, e.g., Schenk, 519 U.S. at 364 (holding that the district court's injunction provision
banning demonstrations within fifteen feet of doorways or doorway entrances of abortion clinics
was constitutional); United States v. Scott, 958 F. Supp. 761, 780-84 (D. Conn. 1997) (permanently
enjoining an abortion protester from coming within fourteen feet of an abortion clinic's entrance),
affd in part, rev 'din part sub nom. United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1998).
108. 530 u.s. 703 (2000).
109. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 18-9-122 (West 2004).
110. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719.
111. /d. at 715-16,720.
112. !d. at 730.
113. 512 u.s. 753 (1994).
114. !d. at 770.
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instance, the buffer zone rendered the passing of information to prospective
patients impossible. Notably, in Madsen the Court purported to impose a
standard for injunctions that it described as "somewhat more·stringent" than
the usual time, place, and manner standard. 115 Ordinarily courts emphasize
that with regard to spatial tailoring, place regulations need not be the least
restrictive alternative available to the state. 116 But in Madsen the Court noted
that in order to be tailored an injunction must "burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest." 117 According to the
Court, this revised standard acknowledged that specific injunctive regulations
of place raise greater content discrimination concerns than do generally
applicable statutes. 118 Specifically, the Court observed that injunctions
"carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do
general ordinances." 119 Even under the revised standard, however, the Court
had little difficulty concluding that the 36-foot buffer satisfied the First
Amendment. 120
Finally, the Court upheld another combination bubble-buffer zone in
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York. 121 The injunction in
Schenck prohibited anti-abortion demonstrators from demonstrating within
15 feet of abortion clinic entrances and driveways, and within 15 feet of
vehicles and patients entering or leaving a clinic. 122 The former restriction
was referred to as a "fixed" buffer zone, and the latter as a "floating" buffer
zone. 123 The Court held that the fixed buffer zone satisfied the Madsen
standard. 124 The 15- foot zone, the Court held, did not burden more speech
than necessary to serve the government's interests in traffic flow, public
safety, and preservation of women's freedom to seek abortion services. 125
The floating buffer zone, however, was invalidated on overbreadth
grounds. 126 Among other infirmities, the Court noted that the floating zone
conceivably applied even to those who lined the sidewalks and curbs to

115. /d. at 765.
116. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 726 ("As we have emphasized on more than one occasion, when
a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy
the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving
the statutory goal."); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (reaffirming "that a
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing so").
117. 512 U.S. at 765.
118. Id. at 764.
119. /d.
120. Id. at 770.
121. 519 u.s. 357 (1997).
122. Id. at 366 n.3.
123. Id. at 361.
124. /d. at 380-83.
125. Id. at 376.
126. Id. at 377.
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chant, shout, or hold signs. 127 Moreover, the Court noted that it would have
been nearly impossible to enforce such a floating zone. 128
In this context, as in the larger political arena, officials have turned to
spatial tactics to defuse a highly charged expressive environment. The areas
near abortion clinics now resemble spatial grids. They are marked with
buffer zones and protective listener bubbles. Spatial tactics substantially
burden rights of association and expression near clinics. They confine
speakers to fixed areas.
They facilitate separation, avoidance, and
surveillance of offensive speakers and speech. They rob speakers of
proximity and immediacy that is critical to their message. They substantially
burden, if they do not entirely prohibit, face-to-face speaker and listener
interaction. And they do all of these things in what remain nominally public
places.

C. University "Free Speech" Zones
Spatial tactics have also become a means of controlling and disciplining
expression on university campuses. In the 1980s and 1990s, several
universities adopted "speech codes" to combat sexual and racial
harassment. 129 For a number of reasons, not least of which were the
vagueness and overbreadth of the codes, as well as their sometimes evident
purpose to suppress certain viewpoints, the codes were invalidated by
courts. 130
This, of course, did not eradicate the problem of harassing, disturbing,
and racist expression on college campuses. University administrators,
unwilling or unable to suppress these ideas outright, sought other means to
limit and control such expression. Many universities, among them Texas
Tech University, New Mexico State University, West Virginia University,
the University of Mississippi, and Florida State University, turned to spatial
tactics. 131 These institutions replaced their free speech codes with free
speech zones. Here, in yet another charged context, the government sought
to quell social and political unrest by turning to place.
Naturally, university officials, like other government officials, insist that
free speech zones serve interests unrelated to the content of the expression-

127. /d.
128. /d. at 378 n.9.
129. William Celis, Universities Reconsidering Bans on Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1992, at Al3 (noting that an estimated "100 colleges and universities in the United States have
adopted codes that prohibit discriminatory or threatening remarks . . . based on race, religion,
ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation").
130. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down
the university's speech code as overbroad and vague); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 477 (arguing that
universities had drafted vague and overbroad regulations to appease "various, widely diverging
political constituencies" and with "only passing concern for ... free speech").
13 1. See generally Davis, supra note 9 (describing the use of campus speech zones).
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interests like safety and pedagogical mission. 132 In many cases, however, the
dimensions of the campus zones leave substantial room for doubt. At West
Virginia University, for example, the original speech zone policy limited
expressive activity to only two small zones on a very large campus. 133
Faculty members described these zones as being "roughly the size of a
classroom." 134 Under pressure from students and faculty, the university
expanded the number of zones from two to seven. 135 Still, the space
encompassed within the expanded area of seven free speech zones amounted
to no more than 5% of the total campus. 136 Ultimately, faced with litigation
and, perhaps more importantly, negative publicity, the university relented
and abandoned its speech zone policy. 137
New Mexico State University similarly set aside three small free speech
zones. 138 Plaintiffs alleged that two of those areas had virtually no pedestrian
traffic at all. 139 Faced with bad publicity and community dissent, the
university adopted a new policy that did not utilize speech zones. 140 This has
been a relatively consistent pattern, as administrators first turn to tactical
zoning only to later reverse their policies in the face of litigation and public
pressure. 141 This does not mean that the zoning issue is not alive on
campuses today. Unchallenged zoning policies, of course, remain in place. 142
And the temptation to turn to spatial tactics is certain to recur with each
episode of campus agitation and umest. Indeed, a lawsuit was recently filed
challenging the University of Maryland's restrictions on outdoor public

132. See, e.g., Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that,
due to safety concerns, a university had a legitimate interest in restricting speech to certain areas);
Auburn Alliance For Peace & Justice v. Martin, 684 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-78 (M.D. Ala. 1988)
(noting that a university's student affairs office may restrict speech to certain facilities to avoid
conflict with academic activities), aff'd, 853 F.2d 931 (II th Cir. 1988).
133. Davis, supra note 9, at 294-95.
134. Id. at 295.
135. See Josh Hafenbrack, Protest Freedoms Reviewed; WVU President Calls Regulations
'Practical Necessity', CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 14, 2002, at I A (noting that under the
university's new policy "[c]rowds larger than 15 are now confined to the areas near [the student
union], like under the old [speech] policy, plus six additional spots").
136. See Tara Tuckwil!er, Bush Twins Talk at WVU; Protesters Nearby, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2004, at IC, available at 2004 WLNR 1198611 ("And at WVU two years ago,
protests were confined to 'free speech zones'-less than 5 percent of campus where university
officials had decided people would be allowed to speak freely.").
137. Davis, supra note 9, at 294.
138. Randal C. Archibold, Student Life; Boxing in Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at
4A.
139. David L. Hudson Jr., Free Speech Zones, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER: FREE SPEECH ON
PUBLIC
COLLEGE
CAMPUSES,
http://www .firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/pubcollege/topic.aspx?topic=free-speech_zones.
140. Archibold, supra note 138, at 4A.
141. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 296 (describing how California's Citrus Community
College rescinded policies establishing speech zones in the face of a lawsuit).
142. See HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE ET AL., FIRE'S GUIDE TO FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 143
(2005) (noting the increasing prevalence of free speech zones on college campuses).
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speaking and leafleting. 143 The university reportedly limited public speaking
on its 1,500-acre campus to a single stage, while limiting the distribution of
literature to certain designated sidewalk space. 144
Although no court has specifically ruled on the constitutionality of
campus free speech zones, university administrators have some reason to be
confident of their validation. A federal district court recently examined the
speech policy adopted by Texas Tech University Law School. 145 The policy
included among its provisions the designation of a "free speech area." 146 The
area, referred to as the "Gazebo," was a "free-standing structure of
approximately 400 square feet adjaeent to the Student Union building." 147
The plaintiff was initially asked by the university to confine his expressive
activities to this area, although he was eventually permitted to speak at a
location approximately 20 feet from the one he had requested. 148 The
plaintiff filed suit complaining that the policy violated his First Amendment
rights. 149 Based upon the "character of a public university campus," the
district court determined that the park areas, sidewalks, streets, and other
"common areas ... are public forums, at least for the University's students,
irrespective of whether the University has so designated them or n6t." 150 ln
these areas, heightened scrutiny would apply to any content-based speech
restrictions. 151 The court treated the "free speech area," the Gazebo, as a
designated public forum subject to the usual standards for content-neutral
place regulation. 152 However, it ignored the propriety of zoning itself and
ultimately invalidated the university's policy, not because it zoned speech in
this manner, but because its requirement that students obtain permission prior
to speaking was overly burdensome. 153
There have been few decisions specifically addressing the
constitutionality of campus "free speech zones.' 1 Universities that have been
challenged have thus far tended to capitulate to public and legal pressure to
abandon the tactic. But the temptation to seek to discipline and control
campus expression is real. Speech zones remain in place on a number of
campuses today. Given courts' treatment of zoning generally, and tactical
places specifically, there is no reason to believe that courts will treat these
143. See AM. CIVIL LiBERTIES UNION, supra note 23, at 6 (discussing protest restrictions on
college campuses after September 11, 2001).
144. /d.
145. Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
146. /d. at 856.
147. ld. at 866 n.l8. Under a later, "interim" policy, this area was expanded to include other
"forum areas" for expression. /d.
148. /d. at 856-57.
149. /d. at 857. After the suit was brought, the university amended its rules and adopted a new
"interim policy," against which the plaintiff brought a facial challenge. /d.
150. /d. at 858, 861.
151. /d. at 862.
152. /d. at 862, 868.
153. /d. at 869-70.

604

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 84:581

speech zones as anything other than content-neutral regulations of the place
of expression. Campus speech zones are, at least, far more likely to survive
scrutiny than the campus speech codes they replaced.

D. "Free Speech" and "Speech-Free" Zones in Other Public Places
Increasingly, public places are being partitioned into free speech and
speech-free zones. The upshot is that one makes a point in the designated
places, or one does not make it at all.
Some type of zoning has been applied to, among other spaces,
airports,' 54 schools, 155 suburbs,' 56 sports arenas,' 57 military bases,' 58 polling
places, 159 churches, 160 courthouses, 161 and other common areas. 162 Spatial
tactics are everywhere; even areas around cemeteries and funerals are now
subject to spatial restrictions in several states. 163 Some of these spatial tactics
are referred to as "free speech" zones. 164 The name certainly implies speech
154. See, e.g., ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 147 F.3d 1282, 1290-91 (lith Cir.
1998) (upholding the designation of eight "First Amendment zones" within an airport for the
distribution of literature); Springfield v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 950 F. Supp. 1482, 1485
(S.D. Cal. 1996) (examining an ordinance limiting expressive activity within an airport to a handful
of 10-by-14 foot "Authorized Solicitation/Free Speech Zones").
155. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, IOl-02 (1972) (rejecting a 150-foot
protest buffer zone around schools as unconstitutional).
156. See, e.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1996) (examining a "[r]estricted
picketing zone" that banned picketing within 200 feet of residences).
157. See, e.g., Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving
a First Amendment challenge brought by a bookseller to an ordinance prohibiting "peddling" of
merchandise within 1,000 feet of the United Center, "home of the Chicago Blackhawks professional
hockey team").
158. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding a probation
term imposing a 250-foot buffer zone around a submarine base).
I 59. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d
738, 748 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding a "campaign-free zone" within 100 feet of a polling place's
entrance); Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a 500-foot campaignfree zone); Freeman v. Burson, 802 S.W.2d 210 (Tenn. 1990) (involving challenges to statutes
prohibiting the solicitation of votes within a 100-foot radius of polling places on election day),
rev'd, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
160. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1998)
(upholding a city ordinance prohibiting demonstrations within 8 feet of entrances to places of
worship).
161. See, e.g., Griderv. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739,750-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding a "buffer
zone" around a courthouse for security reasons during a Ku Klux Klan rally); see also Los Angeles
Bans
Ticket
Challenge
Assistance,
THENEWSPAPER.COM,
Dec.
8,
2005,
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/08/824.asp (noting that the Los Angeles County Court has
issued rules prohibiting "education or counseling" within I 00 feet of a courthouse in response to
protesters' initiation oflegal challenges to red light camera tickets).
162. See, e.g., Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the designation of
three 10-by-10 foot "free speech zones" located in a privately leased, outdoor public area owned by
Portland City and challenged in a suit brought by street preachers).
163. See supra note 10.
164. See, e.g., Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d at 558 (noting that "plaintiffs have also, on occasion,
violated the free speech zones"); Springfield v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 950 F. Supp. 1482,
1485 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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facilitation, but the spaces tend to be quite small in relation to the area of
public space that is then deemed off limits to expressive activity. 165 Other
tactics are sometimes referred to as designated "speech-free zones." 166
These zones, as their name implies, create spaces where speech is expressly
prohibited. 167 They tend to be much larger in dimension than "free speech"
zones. 168 The two basic types of zones are, of course, closely related;
whenever a "free speech" zone is created, the unaffected space becomes a de
facto "speech-free" zone.
As noted, this resort to spatial tactics to control speech in public places
has become the norm.
In a word, spatial tactics have become
institutionalized. Today it is the rare public facility, institution, or space that
does not have a free speech policy. Such policies now routinely provide for
tactical places where expressive activity is permitted. The Cow Palace in
San Francisco, for example, adopted a "First Amendment Expression Policy"
that prohibited individuals from "demonstrating" outside the Palace except in
designated "free expression zones." 169 A "demonstration" was defined to
include "oral advocacy within 75 feet from any point along the front entrance
and/or in the fire zones." 170 In other words, the policy established a 75-foot
"speech-free" zone adjacent to the Palace. The policy further provided for
the creation of three "free expression zones onsite for purposes of
demonstrations." 171 All three "free expression zones" were placed on the
perimeter of a parking lot outside the Palace. 172 The zones were each
roughly the size of a parking space; two of the zones were IO-by-20 feet, and
the third was 16-by- I8 feet. 173 All of the "free expression zones" were
"located between 200 and 265 feet from the main entrance doors to the
arena." 174 None of the zones provided any meaningful access to patrons
165. See SILVERGLATE ET AL., supra note 142, at 143-44 (observing that because free speech
zones only accounted for 1% of West Virginia University, the remaining 99% of the campus
effectively constituted "Censorship Zones"); see also supra notes 154-162 (describing the
exceptionally small size of many free speech zones).
166. See, e.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 661 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
constitutionality of a '"speech-free' zone," also referred to as a "'First-Amendment-free zone"').
167. See Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638 A.2d 1260, 1272 (N.J. 1994) ("The paragraphthree restriction effectively creates a speech-free or buffer zone around the Center: defendants may
not engage in expressive activity in front of the Center because they must remain across the
street.").
168. Compare Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 2002) ("designat[ing] three free speech
zones ... each approximately 10 feet by 10 feet in size"), and Springfield, 950 F. Supp. at 1485
("allow[ing] individuals or groups to engage in these prohibited activities only in a handful of 10' x
14' 'Authorized Solicitation/Free Speech' zones"), with Kirkeby, 92 F.3d at 660 (involving a
speech-free zone that prohibited protesting within 200 feet of a person's house).
169. See Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the Cow
Palace's "First Amendment Expression Policy").
170. /d. at 853.
171. /d.
172. /d. at 854.
173. /d.
174. /d.
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walking from the parking lots to the Palace. 175 This is now a typical spatial
arrangement in the areas surrounding public accommodations.
In sum, there has been a remarkable recent rise in the government's
resort to spatial tactics to control and discipline expression, particularly
expression that agitates, threatens, disturbs, or carries a message of political
protest. Generally speaking, the free speech and speech-free zones described
in this Part are accorded a minimal level of judicial scrutiny. As the Boston
speech cage and countless other existing speech zones demonstrate, the
"intermediate" level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations of
place does not ordinarily bar the use of such spatial tactics. Content-neutral
regulations are acceptable so long as they purport to serve a substantial
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication. 176 As applied, these are very minimal standards. As one
scholar has observed: "The government interest and tailoring requirements
are quite close to the rational basis standard applied to regulations that do
not affect fundamental rights at all." 177
This permissive manipulation of place should disturb a society so
rightfully proud of its commitment to expressive freedom, particularly its
tolerance of public dissent. These spatial tactics are creating public places
that not only fail to facilitate public dissent but are hostile to it. As discussed
in greater detail in Parts III and IV, tactical places suppress certain
viewpoints, thereby distorting the marketplace of social and political
discourse. They brand protesters as inherently dangerous members of
society. They create an environment in which protesters and others who
express divisive ideas are segregated, shunned, and ultimately avoided.
Spatial tactics, then, are not .run-of-the-mill regulations of the place where
speech may occur.
II.

Place as Res

It is difficult at first to comprehend how something like the Boston
speech cage, the "internment camp" the district court described as "a
symbolic affront to the role of free expression," 178 could survive First
Amendment scrutiny. How is it that place can be so liberally manipulated, in
this and the various other examples just discussed, to control the exercise of
fundamental expressive rights? · The puzzle becomes less baffling once one
closely examines the theoretical and doctrinal roots of the First Amendment
175. One zone was located at the bottom of a stairway and offered no opportunity to pass out
leaflets or speak to patrons; another zone was located such that patrons were separated from
demonstrators by barritades and moving cars, making communication "virtually impossible." !d.
176. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
177. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
615,644 (1991) (emphasis added).
178. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61,
74-75 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
2004).
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concept of place. This Part examines the current conception of place, the one
that accounts for the constitutional doctrine of place. Part III will sketch a
reconceptualization of place that views it as distinctly expressive. Part IV
will examine the doctrinal implications of the conception of expressive place.
It will suggest an approach to spatial tactics that takes into account the
intersection of speech and spatiality in tactical places.
The permissive treatment of spatial tactics can be definitively traced to
the core idea that place is merely res-a neutral container, a backdrop for
expression, an inanimate property defined by normatively neutral boundaries.
Indeed, the principal presumption of the First Amendment doctrine of
place-the combination of the public forum and time, place, and manner
doctrines-is that speech and spatiality have little to do with one another.
Neither the government's choice to keep a forum closed to expression, for
example, nor its decision to significantly displace or confine speech is
presently treated as if it raises substantial First Amendment concerns. This
judicial attitude springs from the Court's initial decision, one neither initially
nor subsequently justified with any theoretical rigor, to treat place solely as
property or res. For if place is nothing more than a public resource, the
power to regulate, manage, and control it belongs primarily to. the state.
That, as we shall see, accurately summarizes the history and current position
of place.

A. State-As-Owner ofPlace
When place first entered constitutional and, specifically, judicial
consciousness, public places like streets, sidewalks, and parks were the
principal contested public areas. To the legal and judicial mind, these public
places were naturally considered a genus of property. This meant, of course,
that someone or something owned them and their corresponding bundles of
rights.
In the nineteenth century, the sovereign state owned these places. So
said Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., sitting as a justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court. In Commonwealth v. Davis, Davis made a speech
on the Boston Common without a permit from the mayor. 179 Holmes,
speaking for the court, upheld Davis's conviction under a state licensing
law. 180 The future Supreme Court Justice said: "For the Legislature
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." 181 The Supreme

179. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 N.E. 577 (Mass. 1886) and 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895)
(disposing of a defendant charged under the statute requiring government permission to "deliver a
sermon, lecture, address, or discourse on the [Boston! Common"), aff'd sub nom. Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
180. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. at 113.
181. !d.
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Court affirmed on similar logic: "The right to absolutely exclude all right to
use, necessarily includes the authority to determine under what
circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the
lesser." 182
Thus, just as a private homeowner controlled access to and activity upon
his lawn or front porch, so did the state own and control the streets,
sidewalks, and parks-what we now refer to as "traditional public forums."
A citizen could no more occupy a public park without the state's permission
than he could sit in his neighbor's back yard without an invitation. In other
words, at the very moment it entered constitutional consideration, place was
conceptualized as nothing more than res. The bundle of rights in the res of
place initially belonged exclusively to the state.
B. State-As-Trustee of Place
It should come as no particular surprise that this ownership theory did
not survive. Much of the revolutionary past had been acted out on the public
streets ·and in other public places. Although the concept of state-as-owner of
wide swaths of public space officially survived for some four decades, it was
seemingly formally abandoned in Hague v. C/0. 183 In Hague, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Jersey City ordinance that imposed a permit requirement
for speech in all public places. 184 In now famous dictum, the Court stated
that wherever title to the streets and public parks may lie, these spaces have
"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions." 185
This dictum subtly transformed the state from the owner of public
streets and parks to the trustee of the res of such public places. Although the
change in state status and function was significant, it occurred without any
theoretical reconsideration of the basic concept of place. The Hague Court
merely replaced state-as-owner with another familiar legal property concept,
namely state-as-trustee. Place remained res.
What did change was the nature of the state's relationship to the res. As
a result of the state's transition from owner to trustee, the focus of this
relationship shifted away from the state's right to exclude persons from the
res. The state appeared to have lost this power, at least with regard to streets
and parks. Instead, judicial attention turned to setting the operative rules of
the metaphorical trust. As trustee, the state had an obligation to preserve and
manage the res of public space for the benefit of the people, the putative trust
beneficiaries. Like any other trustee, the state had an obligation to do so

182.
183.
184.
185.

Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. at 48.
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Id. at 500, 518.
Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
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neutrally, without official bias concerning the substance of what a speaker or
user said in these places. As trustee, the state was to perform several basic
tasks: to guarantee some minimal right of access to the public streets,
sidewalks, and parks; to resolve competing claims to the res; and to generally
preserve the condition of the res for public use.
As noted, the metaphorical trust did not permit the trustee-state to
completely deny citizens access to the trust res. "Such use of the streets and
public places," the Hague Court said, "has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." 186 Some minimal
right of access had passed to citizen-beneficiaries through the mythical trust
instrument. Indeed, many of the early cases involving consideration of
access to public streets and sidewalks emphasized this basic right of
access. 187 This was, of course, the famous era of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
who sought to distribute handbills and other literature on the streets, where
people could generally be found. 188 It was in this era that the Court most
jealously guarded the beneficiary's right of access. The public streets and
parks were not places where listeners could expect to be protected from
offensive speech. Indeed, the Court emphasized in particular the state's
obligation to protect the dissemination of "novel and unconventional ideas
[that] might disturb the complacent." 189 The trust provided the unwilling
listener no general right of privacy on the public ways; the First Amendment
in this respect protected a robust public square.
But if the property ownership model upset deeply felt republican
sensibilities, the idea that public places were to be simply thrown open to the
masses threatened order and, perhaps ultimately, the rule oflaw. The state is,
of course, no ordinary trustee. It is at once trustee and sovereign, and in the
latter capacity possesses substantial police powers. To further the res
metaphor, these powers might be considered part of a metaphorical
addendum to the trust instrument. By virtue of these special powers, the state
is authorized to resolve competing claims to the res. As the Court observed,
some regulation of public places like streets was necessary "'to prevent
confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure convenient use of
the streets by other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder. "' 190 So
long as the state was not given absolute discretion to exclude persons from
the trust res, for instance through an unbridled licensing scheme, it would be

186. /d.
187. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (striking down ban on distribution
of literature).
188. See Kalven, supra note 26, at 1 (noting the early influence of Jehovah's Witnesses on the
development of the public forum concept).
189. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
190. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (quoting State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508
(N.H. 1940)); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (stating that "two
parades cannot march on the same street simultaneously, and government may allow only one").
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permitted, as any trustee must be, to resolve competing claims to the res. 191
There was no apparent reason to suppose that the state, as trustee, would fail
to perform this task in a neutral and objective manner. 192
In addition to resolving competing claims of access, the trustee-state
was also supposed to ensure that no beneficiary or group of beneficiaries
substantially interfered with the primary purpose for which streets and other
public thoroughfares exist. In fact, the origins of the "time, place, and
manner" doctrine lie here, in the state's power to preserve the res for its
primary use. 193 The earliest spatial restrictions focused on ensuring the free
flow of traffic on public ways. 194 As the Court observed in one early case,
"[A] person could not exercise [First Amendment rights] by taking his stand
in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and
maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic." 195 As well, "[A] group of
distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon
across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a
tendered leaflet." 196 Nor, of course, would one be "justified in ignoring the
familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey
the municipal command." 197
These are exceptionally easy cases. Note in particular the evident
neutrality of these sorts of spatial concerns-two conflicting parades or
processions; speeches in the middle of crowded streets; the outright blockage
of all pedestrian traffic. The state, no less than any ordinary trustee, must be
empowered to combat this sort of confusion and disorder when it impacts the
res of public place. Indeed, it has an obligation under the trust to do so. 198
There was thus no reason to question the state's neutrality, or to look for any
covert biases in early spatial regulations. Indeed, it was nearly impossible to
191. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 (agreeing with the state court that because the statute did not vest
the licensing board with "arbitrary power or an unfettered discretion," the state could still issue
licenses for parades or processions in order to "giv[ e] the public authorities notice ... to afford
opportunity for proper policing").
192. See id ("If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades
or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without
unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the streets.").
193. See id (noting that with regard to a license for a parade or procession, the state court had
considered factors of "time, place and manner so as to conserve the public convenience" when
defming the duties of the licensing authority and potential licensee); cf Steven L. Winter, An
Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1885-1901
(1991) (noting that Hague's "time, place, and manner" doctrine for public spaces was developed in
accordance with changing conceptions of the purposes of such public spaces).
194. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ("Municipal authorities, as trustees
for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of
people and property, the primary purpose for which the streets are dedicated.").
195. !d
196. !d
197. Cox, 312 U.S. at 574.
198. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953) ("The principles of the First
Amendment are not to be treated as a promise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may
gather around him at any public place ... a group for discussion or instruction.").
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detect any connection between speech and spatiality in these circumstances.
The state was not at this point segmenting, zoning, or partitioning public
places. It was dealing with the res of place as it was, as it existed. In
managing place in this fashion, the state could plausibly argue that it was
managing things like traffic and competing uses, not expression and dissent.
More or less simultaneously with its initial consideration of spatial
regulations, the Court was also beginning to confront issues regarding the
appropriate timing and manner of expression in public places. Trust
beneficiaries obviously could not be permitted to use the trust res at all
hours, or in any manner they wished. Early cases emphasized, for example,
that one could not claim a constitutional right to disturb the peace by blaring
loudspeakers in the middle of the night on a residential street. 199 So the
metaphorical trust was amended once again, this time to include some degree
of state control over the time and manner of expression as well as over its
place. And as with place, so long as the trustee-state did not use time or
manner as a pretext for content discrimination, it would be permitted to
regulate these aspects of the expressive environment as well.
The concept of place as trust res was simply a reflexive substitution of
one familiar legal property model for another. Although the state did not
own public places, its grip on them remained substantial under the model of
trusteeship. Note that from the beginning, the Court's conception of place
was primarily instrumental. The trustee was empowered to preserve "the
primary uses of streets and parks."200 Of course, the primary use of the
streets is the conveyance of people and vehicles, not thoughts and ideas.
Parks exist primarily for entertainment, not expression. Moreover, pursuant
to the trust, expressive and associative rights extended only to public places
"where people have a right to be for [speech] purposes. " 201 It fell principally
to the trustee-state to determine the "appropriate" place for the exercise of
expressive rights? 02 At least initially, this did not entail expressive zoning
and partitioning. The state was able to manage the res of place while still
providing ample space for public discourse, including often uncomfortable
face-to-face interactions? 03

199. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding !he general regulation of
sound trucks); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (supporting a licensing scheme for the
use of amplifiers in public places).
200. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,276 (1951).
201. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,578 (1965).
202. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[One} is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on !he plea that it may be exercised in some
other place." (emphasis added)).
203. See, e.g., id. at 160 ("So long as legislation [limiting access to public streets} does not
abridge !he constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through
speech or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of !hose using !he
streets.").
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C. State-As-Proprietor of Place
Things became much more complicated when speakers sought access to
public places beyond the streets, sidewalks, and parks. The expressive
topography, the public space the state was entrusted to manage, rapidly
expanded to include a range of new places. Beginning in the 1960s, speakers
sought access to a variety of public places where potential listeners might be
found. They demanded access to public libraries, 204 jails,205 buses, 206 military
bases/07 schools, 208 theaters, 209 and mailboxes. 21 Consequently, the Court
was forced to approach place more systematically. Having chosen property
as a conceptual model for place, the Court was obliged to confront the
inherent malleability of this concept. The idea of "place," it turned out, was
flexible enough to encompass even metaphysical places, such as candidate
debates, 211 charitable campaigns,212 and government programs. 213
While the trusteeship functions involved managing the res of streets,
sidewalks, and parks, these new access claims raised far more substantial
issues. Now a method was required for literally defining which places were
open to expression, and which were not. And, of course, the Court had to

°

204. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (holding that a state cannot use
regulations as a pretext for imposing criminal penalties on protesters engaged in a lawful and
peaceful protest against segregation within ~public library).
205. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1966) (holding that the state could convict
protesters under a trespassing statute for entering a nonpublic county jail where the arrests were
made because of the trespass and not the content of the protest).
206. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974) (holding that bus car
cards were not a "public forum," and that the city, no less than any other proprietor, was entitled to
make managerial decisions with regard to the advertisements it would accept).
207. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976) (holding that protesters had no
generalized constitutional right to make political speeches at a military base and that government
and military authorities may apply objective and even-handed policies that designate military
property a nonpublic forum).
208. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (prohibiting the selective
exclusion of certain picketing groups from protesting next to a school).
209. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-56 (1975) (holding that a
municipal theater in which petitioners wished to present a musical was a public forum because it
was "designed for and dedicated to expressive activities," and that the government was therefore not
permitted to make content distinctions).
210. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983)
(holding that a school district could distinguish between two teachers' unions, only one of which
was the official representative of the township's teachers, in determining access to the school
system's interschool mailbox system).
211. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (holding that a
state-owned public television broadcaster, while subject to constitutional constraints applicable to
nonpublic fora, can exclude certain candidates from participation in a televised debate if the
decision is based on a "reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion").
212. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985) (holding
that the government does not necessarily violate the First Amendment when it excludes certain
political advocacy and legal defense groups from the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive
aimed at federal employees).
213. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (invalidating speech
restrictions in connection with governmental funding).
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determine who was going to decide this critical question, and with how
much, if any, oversight. These were momentous decisions insofar as the
exercise of public expressive rights were concerned. Indeed, they would
determine the shape of the expressive topography for years to come. Here,
then, was a most appropriate opportunity to rethink the idea of place.
But there was to be no broad rethinking of place in this or, indeed, any
subsequent era. Instead, the Court proceeded to further entrench the res
concept. In an important article, Harry Kalven, Jr. interpreted certain cases
from the civil rights period as recognizing the critical importance of place to
expressive and associative rights. 214 Kalven implicitly accepted the property
or res model of place. He argued that a "First Amendment-easement"
existed with respect to certain public places. 215 Kalven opined that the public
streets and parks, in particular, were a "forum" that speakers could
"commandeer" in the quest to convince the public to support civil rights. 216
This, of course, turned the early ownership principle almost completely on its
head. In the I970s and 1980s, the Court adopted Kalven's easement
metaphor and "forum" terminology. 217 But as the public forum doctrine's
history demonstrates, the Court has never approached Kalven's enthusiasm
for the power of place to facilitate First Amendment freedoms. It has
soundly rejected the notion that speakers can commandeer public places.
And it has steadfastly held to the notion that place is merely a form of
property or res.
Faced with the potential explosion of demand for place, the Court
sought to control and simplify it through the vehicle of categorization. 218 The
entire mass of public space, the Court said, could be partitioned into "public"
and "nonpublic" forums. 219 In the most recent iteration of the state's
relationship to place, the Court essentially commissioned the state
"proprietor" of all public places?20 Proprietorship vested the state with even
more power over place than it exercised as trustee. Proprietorship meant that
the state would be responsible for determining whether a public place, other
than a public street, sidewalk, or park, was open to expressive activity at all.
Thus, with regard to the vast majority of public places, the state was once

214. Kalven, supra note 26.
215. /d. at 13.
216. /d. at 12.
217. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature ofPublic Forum Analysis:
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1221-22 (1984)
(noting that Professor Kalven's "'public forum' has appeared in ... thirty-two Supreme Court
decisions ... [and] two of these decisions were rendered prior to 1970 and thirteen of the thirty-two
have been in the 1980's" (citations omitted)).
218. See Massey, supra note 26, at 309 (observing that "the Court has formulated its public
forum doctrine-which determines the amount of judicial scrutiny any particular speech restriction
on public property receives-almost entirely by categorizing the property").
219. /d.
220. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725-26 (1990) (discussing the principle of
governmental proprietorship of public places).
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again owner of the res-it possessed the authority to exclude all expressive
activity on these public properties.
In doctrinal terms, there are now three familiar forum types. The
"traditional public forum" is, at least ostensibly, the quintessential free
speech zone. Such forums are identified with reference to "objective
characteristics" of the res, such as whether, "by long tradition or by
government fiat," the property has "been devoted to assembly and debate."221
Streets, sidewalks, and parks are exemplary. In fact, the Court has indicated
that they exhaust the category.222 In these places, ordinary trust rules apply:
The state may not prohibit all expressive activity; it can enforce a regulation
based upon content or viewpoint only if it can demonstrate a compelling
purpose for doing so and can show that its distinction is narrowly drawn to
achieve that purpose; and it can enforce reasonable, nondiscriminatory "time,
place, and manner" regulations. 223 There are two other types of forums.
Neither category directly affects the constitutionality of spatial tactics. It is
necessary to describe them, however, in order to accurately depict the
Court's current conception of the expressive topography. 224 In addition to
traditional public forums, there are "designated" public forums. These
expressive places are created only "by purposeful governmental action."225
Mere inertia or inaction is not enough; a speaker cannot claim any right of
access unless the state has intentionally opened the forum to public
discourse. 226 That intention must be clearly manifested. 227 Objective
indicators of state intent include such things as "the policy and practice of the
government" and the "nature of the property and its compatibility with

221. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
222. Indeed, the Court has "rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends
beyond its historic confines." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
223. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984) (noting that time,
place, and manner regulations must be justified without regard to the content of speech, be
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant [government] interest," and "leave open ample alternative
channels for communication").
224. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
225. /d.
226. See id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)) {determining that once the government intentionally opens a forum for public dialogue, if a
speaker in the class of people to which the forum is generally made available is excluded, then the
government will be subject to strict scrutiny).
227. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (explaining that when the government designates a public
forum "by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public disclosure," the Court looks to a
number of "objective" indicators "to discern the government's intent"). Compare Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (holding that the state evidences a clear intent to create a public
forum if it has intentionally opened a venue for public disclosure through an express policy of
permitting its meeting facilities to be open to specified persons), with U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (holding that the Court "will not find that a
public fornm has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, ... nor will [the
Court] infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the property
is inconsistent with expressive activity").
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expressive activity."228 Assuming the state has manifested the requlSlte
intent, the rules of engagement in terms of regulating expression are
precisely the same in this sort of forum as in the traditional public forum. 229
All remaining government properties are essentially speech-free zones;
they are either nonpublic forums or are not expressive forums at all. 230
Expressive rights in these places are nearly nonexistent. Here the state's
relationship to place is closest to the ownership metaphor. 231 It may make
distinctions in access based upon subject matter as well as on the basis of
speaker identity. 232 Regulation of access must only be "reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view." 233
Public forum doctrine has been severely criticized, not least for the
absence of any theoretical foundation for the haphazardly derived and
simplistic categorical approach. 234 It is unnecessary to revisit those critiques
here. The upshot is that the Court has fashioned a very anemic expressive
topography, one that does not leave much space for public speech. 235 The
Court seems not to have been prepared for the complexity and variability of

228. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
229. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(holding that the government, when it opens a designated puhlic forum, "is bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum").
230. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-78. I have purposefully excluded from this general description
the idea of the "limited public forum" that, as others have noted, is a doctrinally incoherent concept.
See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1757 (1987) (arguing that the Court's subsequent treatments of
"limited" public forums "shrink[] the limited public forum to such insignificance that it is difficult
to imagine how a plaintiff could ever suceessfully prosecute a lawsuit to gain access to such a
forum").
231. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (reiterating that the government has essentially all the property
rights of a private owner with respect to public property that is not a forum for public
communication).
232. !d. at 49.
233. !d.
234. Representative critiques are numerous. Ronald A. Cass, First Amendment Access to
Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287, 1308-09 (1979); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of
the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 110
(1986); Farber & Nowak, supra note 217, at 1234-35; David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in
Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 175,
178-79 (1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247 (1976); Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentNeutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 93 (1987); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public
Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 341 (1986). Robert Post
has provided the most rigorous theoretical justification for the Court's public forum doctrine. See
generally Post, supra note 230.
235. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 217, at 1234 (arguing that the public forum doctrine has
"only confused judicial opinions by diverting attention from the real first amendment issues
involved in the cases"); Post, supra note 27, at 1777 (concluding that the public forum doctrine's
"present focus 'on the eharacter of the property at issue' is a theoretical dead end, because there is
no satisfactory theory connecting the classification of government property with the exercise of the
first amendment rights").
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place that confronted it in the 1960s. ln the face of this spatial complexity,
the Court clung to the familiar concept of res. 1t did very briefly entertain a
speech-facilitative conception of place, one that would require that speakers
be provided access to space so long as their expressive activity was
"compatible" with it. 236 But for reasons unexplained, the Court rapidly
retreated to a standard that placed no obligation whatsoever on the state to
facilitate expression by making room for it. 237 The state-proprietor, like the
state-trustee, merely had to remain neutral with regard to content. As
proprietor, the state decides whether undifferentiated "space" ever becomes
expressive place.
Throughout its development, the doctrine of place has treated the state's
mapping of the expressive topography as a presumptively neutral endeavor.
Forums are created objectively, based principally upon property management
concerns. The time, place, and manner doctrine applies only where the state
is neutral with regard to content, the presumption being that place itself has
nothing to do with the substance of speech. For all that appears, then, place
is neither counected to speech nor subject to manipulation by the state. Like
any other res, place merely exists; it is a brute construct. Like water, air, or
any other collective resource, place communicates nothing. It is merely
location.
III. Speech and Spatiality
Place-as-res is an entrenched First Amendment concept. Indeed, some
have suggested that it is too late in the day to alter this dominant conception
of place. There is no denying that place is, in fundamental respects, a species
of property. But it does not necessarily follow that res exhausts the place
concept, or that we must accept that place has little or nothing to do with
expression.
The Court has never provided any theoretical basis or
justification for confining place to this narrow conception. Thus, we need
not feel bound by or beholden to it.
The increasing use of spatial tactics described in Part I provides an
occasion for rethinking the entrenched concept of place-as-res. What is the
relationship between speech and spatiality? ls place really just an inert
background? ls it a given, brute fact? Are all state regulations of place
properly presumed content- and value-neutral? Similar questions regarding
place bave been posed by scholars in a host of other disciplines, including
sociology, anthropology, history, geography, architectural science, literary
studies, and philosophy. 238 Place was once mere background in these

236. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (inquiring "whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time").
23 7. See supra text accompanying notes 221-231.
238. See, e.g., EDWARDS. CASEY, THE FATE OF PLACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY, at xi-xii
(1997) (noting the "burgeoning interest in place" in various disciplines today, including
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disciplines as well. 239 But many scholars have recently rediscovered and
reinvigorated place; they have brought it out of its background position into
the foreground. 240 In order to achieve a fuller understanding of the
implications of the state's use of spatial tactics, and ultimately of the
intersection of speech and spatiality more generally, this Part seeks to do the
same for place as it relates to First Amendment concerns.
To understand the intersection of speech and spatiality, we must also
"fashion[] a fresh face for place."241 This Part contends that place is not
merely res; it is, as well, a distinct form and manifestation of expression.
Tactical places do not simply regulate or relocate expressive behavior. They
represent something more. A conception of place as distinctly expressive
can help us understand what that something is. This conception shall be
referred to as "expressive place." Unlike the undertheorized conception of
place-as-res, "expressive place" has a rich intellectual pedigree, one with
roots in several disciplines. Expressly rejecting the vision of place as inert
backdrop, expressive place highlights the variability of place, the primacy of
place to expression, the constructive nature of "place," and its dynamism or
expressive qualities. Place can be a highly charged and purposeful construct,
a repository of meaning, and a symbol of social and political control.
Viewing tactical places in this light reveals the need for a more rigorous form
of judicial scrutiny. Part IV sets forth arguments and specific proposals for
approaching and analyzing tactical places, not as res or property but rather as
expressive places.

A. Expressive Place
Courts and many commentators no doubt recognize that spatiality
affects expressive activity. indeed, perhaps the most common, although
generally implicit, criticism of the public forum doctrine is that it fails to
facilitate speech by making adequate room for expression. 242 But neither the
mostly tacit recognition of place's importance to expression nor the critical
analyses of the public forum concept arise from any concept of place
different from or beyond res. Courts and commentators cannot seem to get
past the idea that place is merely a form of property. To the extent that

anthropology, architecture, and ecology); Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift, Introduction to THINKING
SPACE 1, 2 (Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift eds., 2000) (introducing a collection of works addressing
the importance of space in various disciplines).
239. See CASEY, supra note 238, at ix-xi (portraying place as historically having been taken for
granted, lying "deeply dormant in modem Western thinking").
240. See, e.g., Crang & Thrift, supra note 238, at 25 ("What we can say is that the 'where' is
now joining the 'who,' the 'what,' and the 'why' of philosophy and social theory on roughly equal
terms.").
241. CASEY, supra note 238, at 286.
242. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1536 (1998) (criticizing the public forum doctrine as "deeply inhospitable to
speech in new or nontraditional forums").
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questions of "where" arise, they are analyzed as if "forums" and "zones"
merely serve to mark neutral boundaries. This approach underestimates and
devalues place, which is both more complex and more intimately associated
with expression than the res concept allows. What follows is a more
accurate conception of place and a more nuanced understanding of the
intersection of speech and spatiality. This sketch, largely borrowed from
disciplines that treat place as a central object of study, will help lawyers,
legal scholars, judges, legislators, executive officials, and the public itself
better appreciate what is at stake when governments regulate place generally,
and when they use spatial tactics in particular.
1. The Variability of Place .-The expressive place concept requires
that we move beyond the simple, binary public-nonpublic categorization
currently used under the public forum doctrine. It also requires that we cease
viewing public areas as generally undifferentiated masses of space. There
are at least twice as many types of places than the public forum doctrine
currently recognizes. Each type of place raises discrete speech issues,
touches upon different expressive traditions, and constitutes a distinct part of
our expressive topography.
Scholars in disciplines outside the law have concluded that place is a
highly variable concept. 243 It is, some have observed, "as complex as
voice." 244 To aid their study of place, anthropologists have identified a
variety of different types of places. Among these are what are sometimes
referred to in the literature as "contested" places, "inscribed" places, "nonplaces," "embodied" places, and, finally, "tactical" places. 245 To begin to
move beyond res, it is helpful to conceive of the expressive topography in
similar terms.
"Contested" places are those that constitute the focus of some
expressive dispute, such that being in this specific place is a critical aspect of
the speaker's message. "Inscribed" places are primarily those with specific
historical and symbolic significance, such as the National Mall and Central
Park. History, including social and political conflict, is written in and on
these places. A "non-place" is essentially undifferentiated space that has no
opportunity to develop into a cultural and social place; 246 in the First
243. See Crang & Thrift, supra note 238, at 2 (referring to the concept of space as defined by
various disciplines as a "Babel of conflicting interpretations").
244. Margaret C. Rodman, Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality, in THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 205.
245. Many of these labels can be found in the description of places in Low & LawrenceZufiiga, supra note 18, at 1-38. The list does not, of course, exhaust the types of expressive places.
No discussion of expressive place would be complete, for example, without a treatment of cyberplaces. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995)
(discussing democratizing features of speech in cyberspaces). The specific focus of this Article is
on real space expressive concerns, most notably protest in public spaces.
246. See lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-83 (1992) (holding
that airports, as a class of property, are nonpublic forums). See generally MARC AUGE, NON-
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Amendment context, airports are one example, since they are currently
treated as nonpublic forums where speech is especially limited. Spatial
tactics can sometimes create this kind of space. "Embodied" places raise
issues of spatiality and privacy; they involve access to personal space, as in
the abortion clinic context. "Tactical" places, as mentioned, are the
constructed products of spatial tactics, as described in Part I. They are cages,
zones, pens, and other places designed to control expressive activity.
It is not necessary to develop these various space-types in greater detail
here. The point is that expressive place is far more complex than the concept
of place-as-res and the First Amendment doctrine of place suggest. With
regard to spatial tactics, two things should be emphasized. First, as scholars
in other disciplines have noted, spatial tactics produce a discrete type of
place. The architectures of spatial tactics are not ordinary regulations of
place; they are themselves places. Second, given its complexity and
variability, "place" requires a far more specific and nuanced analysis than the
doctrine of place currently provides. Even the brief description above
indicates that each type of place possesses unique characteristics. Each
place-type raises discrete concerns with respect to matters such as the quality
of social interaction within the place, public access to it, and the historical
practices, meanings, and expressive. memories associated with the place.
Speech and spatiality intersect differently in each of these places.
2. The Primacy of Place.-Ancient Greek philosophers were among the
first to recognize the "firstness" of space and place. Aristotle observed in his
Physics that "[t]he power of place will be remarkable."247 That sentiment has
been echoed at various times, and by a variety of thinkers, through the ages.
Thomas Hobbes said in Leviathan: "No man therefore can conceive any
thing, but he must conceive it in some place."248 Phenomenologists have
long recognized that place is a critical part of our "being-in-the-world."249
"To be at all-to exist in any way-is to be somewhere, and to be
somewhere is to be in some kind ofplace."250
"Nothing we do is unplaced."251 This is, of course, as true of expression
as anything else. 252 This makes the relative indifference to the concept of

PLACES: INTRODUCTION TO AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF SUPERMODERNITY ( 1995) (defining non-places
as spaces formed in relationship to certain ends that, unlike anthropological places, are not
essentially social).
247. CASEY, supra note 238, at ix (emphasis omitted).
248. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Il-12 (Ernest Rhys ed., The Temple Press Letchworth
1940)(1651).
249. HUBERT L. DREYFUS, BEING-IN-THE-WORLD: A COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER'S BEING
AND TIME, DIVISION I (7th ed. 1997).
250. CASEY, supra note 238, at ix.
251. ld.
252. Even expression that takes place in cyber-places, which seem to have no connection to
place as it is traditionally understood, takes place somewhere. ld. at xii-xvi ("Granting that the
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place in constitutional jurisprudence and literature all the more remarkable.
Place is a critical, if not the critical, foundation for all expressive rights.
Along with the basic abilities to speak, read, and hear, it makes these rights
possible. The Court has on occasion at least hinted at this fact. lt has said
that expressive freedom requires a robust marketplace ofideas. 253 Moreover,
as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, expression requires adequate
"breathing space" for its effective exercise. 254 And debate can hardly be
"wide open" 255 without adequate physical places set aside for the airing of
positions and arguments in public discourse. But these are simple metaphors,
not commitments to making physical space for speech. The doctrine of
place, and the res concept itself, belie any professed understanding that
speech can thrive only when given adequate room or space.
Spatial adequacy is critical, particularly when considering the use and
effects of spatial tactics. The idea of spatial "primacy" does not suggest
merely an increase in total, or net, expressive surface area. It requires, rather,
a careful consideration of the specific properties and characteristics of places,
whatever the forum, that are made available to speakers. This is so because
the character of place substantially affects the experience of expression. An
enclosed cage, a parking lot, some space at the bottom of a stairwell, and a
small gazebo are all places where expressive activity can occur, to be sure,
but they are surely not encouraging or facilitative places. The particular
geometries and architectures of place have a substantial and profound impact
on the substance of expressive rights. This is just one of the ways in which
speech and spatiality are intimately related.
Sociologists have long recognized this fundamental principle of
spatiality: The specific qualities of a place condition the possibilities of
social interaction within that place. 256 Georg Simmel, in his seminal article
The Sociology of Space, carefully examined how spatial conditions affect
social interaction. 257 Especially in the past decade or so, many architects,
geographers, and anthropologists have reached the same insight with respect
to the influence of spatial characteristics on such things as the quality of

literal locus of the technologically engaged person is a matter of comparative indifference, this
locus is still not nowhere.").
253. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (stating that the "government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas").
254. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
255. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963).
256. See, e.g., HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 73 (Donald Nicholson-Smith
trans., Blackwell Publishing 1991) (1974); YI-FU TuAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF
EXPERIENCE 101-17 (1977); David E. Sopher, Place and Location: Notes on the Spatial Patterning
of Culture, 53 Soc. Scl. Q. 321-37 (1972).
257. See Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Space, reprinted in SIMMEL ON CULTURE: SELECTED
WRITINGS 137 (David Frisby & Mike Featherstone eds., 1997). For a general discussion of
Simmel's sociological examination of space, see John Allen, On Georg Simmel.· Proximity,
Distance and Movement, in THINKING SPACE, supra note 238, at 54, 54-55.
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urban living, the nature of local culture, even citizens' feelings with regard to
nationality. 258
We may add to this list of things affected by spatial characteristics the
enjoyment of expressive rights, which are crucial to social interaction in our
society. The principle of spatial primacy indicates that the exercise of these
rights depends not only upon some minimal provision of space, but
specifically on places that facilitate communication and citizen interaction.
The architecture of a place is thus critical to an examination of the scope of
expressive rights afforded by that place.
3. The Production of Place.-Merely recogmzmg these first two
features of space-variability and primacy-should lead courts to ask more
appropriate questions with regard to tactical places: How, specifically, do
these places relate to expression? How are they created? By whom? For
what purpose? What are their characteristics, their architectural features?
How do these features affect social interaction and communication inside and
outside these places? Who or what is most affected by tactical places?
What, if anything, do they symbolize or communicate to those inside and
those outside their boundaries?
In treating place as an undifferentiated mass, place-as-res misses yet
another critical link between speech and spatiality. Scholars in other
disciplines have long recognized that the process whereby places take
shape-who is responsible for their design, who is being burdened, at what
point in time, and why-is a matter of critical importance in understanding
the significance of place. 259 Theorists and social scientists have thus made
the "production" of place a subject of independent study. 26° Critical human
geography, a branch of the geographic discipline informed by Marxism,
feminism, and poststructuralism, places special emphasis on the idea that
places are not given but made. 261 Two basic principles follow from this
theoretical perspective. First, it is through the process of social production
that the raw material of undifferentiated space becomes place. 262 Second, at
least according to critical theorists, places are generally created by some

258. See generally Low & Lawrence-ZUiiiga, supra note 18, at 1-37 (surveying the approaches
of anthropology, environmental psychology, sociology, architecture, geography, and urban planning
to place).
259. For a critical acconnt of this process, see LEFEBVRE, supra note 256, at II ("Later on I
shall demonstrate the active-the operational or instrumental-role of space, as knowledge and
action, in the existing mode of production.").
260. See, e.g., id.
261. See TiM CRESSWELL, PLACE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 26--29 (2004) (describing the work
of critical geographers).
262. See TuAN, supra note 256, at 6 ("What begins as undifferentiated space becomes plaee as
we get to know it better and endow it with value.").
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class of people with more power than others. 263 These power-elites decide
what is or is not appropriate within any particular place. 264
Place-as-res downplays this process, treating "forum" as a mere label
for property that exists rather than a place that is continually in process. A
"public forum" is not merely a historical artifact defined by its original
function and the state's subsequent use of the property. Forums, whether
they are streets or parks or airports, are judicial, social, and governmental
constructs. Res does not capture the dynamic process of spatial production,
the manner in which people connect to places, or are prevented from doing
so. For example, the primary purpose of a street, as the Court has
emphasized, 265 is to facilitate travel or movement. As raw material, asphalt
and stone, a street is seemingly unrelated to expression. But the street
becomes a "forum" for expressive activity when courts, government officials,
and citizens declare its existence, regulate it, and actively utilize it,
respectively. "Place," in other words, is actively produced by the interaction,
combination, and collision of laws, rules, norms of behavior, and social
practices. 266
Once again, although we do not tend to conceptualize them as such,
speech zones, cages, and pens are places. They too are constructed or
produced. These mini-forums are carved from preexisting forums like
streets, ostensibly to make room for speech or to direct it to locales that
officials consider more appropriate. The production of such tactical places
results in this simple fact: People speak here, or they do not speak at all.
What speakers say, and how they say it, will depend upon the specific
characteristics of these places, which are in tum a function of the nature of
the spatial tactics used. Ultimately, whether zoned or partitioned areas
become expressive places, or remain undifferentiated and inert spaces,
depends on a number of factors: the properties of the area set aside for
speech; the restrictions on activities within; and the interactions users have
with the place itself and with those outside its boundaries.
As critical geographers surmise, tactical places, like most others, are
constructed primarily by those who possess power to contain and control
those who do not. 267 Whether it is a mailbox, a military base, a sidewalk, or
263. For an influential account of the construction of space, see generally LEFEBVRE, supra
note 256.
264. See CRESSWELL, supra note 261, at 12 ("Place, at a basic level, is space invested with
meaning in the context of power.").
265. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 750 (1965) (declaring that '"(m]unicipal
authorities ... have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of
people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated"' (quoting Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939))).
266. See MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 108 (Steven F. Rendall
trans., 1984) (emphasizing the manner in which human activity makes places).
267. See. e.g., NICHOLAS L. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER, at
xiii (1994) (positing judges and lawmakers as overlooked framers of space); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 236 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1977) (highlighting the

2006]

Speech and Spatial Tactics

623

a buffer zone, "place," properly understood, is a manifestation of this power
dynamic. This is not difficult to see insofar as tactical places are concerned.
Planning boards, campus officials, lawmakers, and law enforcement officials
are the architects of tactical places. The contours of these places suit their
needs. Given the power granted to these officials as trustees and proprietors
of public areas, we should be far more concerned with understanding who or
what is being placed in tactical places. The mere fact that protesters, social
agitators, and others who challenge the status quo are disparately confined to
these spaces does not necessarily demonstrate a violation of expressive
rights. But the identity of those confined does support the notion that place
manifests power and that this power can be used to muffle or silence certain
points of view. And that, of course, does implicate serious First Amendment
concerns. In any event, it should be evident that using spatial tactics entails
more than the mere partitioning of some res or parcel of property. It is an
exercise of the power, granted doctrinally to the state as trustee and
proprietor of public space, to displace political dissent and speech that is
likely to offend viewers and listeners.
Taking into account place's primacy, the state's power to influence the
production of tactical and other places can lead to a substantial impact on
expressive and associative rights. As noted, the character of a place strongly
influences social interaction and, by extension, the enjoyment of expressive
rights within. The process of social construction "defines the experience of
space through which 'peoples' social exchanges, memories, images and daily
use of the material setting' transform it and give it meaning." 268 This
conception of place as a social construct is, in contrast to place-as-res, no
empty vessel or mere backdrop. Here place is viewed as a repository and
manifestation of social exchange, memories, images, uses, and meaning.
Thus, the power to define which public areas are open to expression, and just
how open they will be, is ultimately the power to affect not only expression,
but a great deal more than that as well. 269
We must, as one scholar said, move "away from a sense of space as a
practico-inert container of action towards space as a socially produced set of
manifolds."270 The res concept does not permit this sort of conceptual
advancement. As a result, we are led to believe that the state's control of the
spatial terms of expression is generally nothing more than the neutral
partitioning of public properties. By viewing place as a construct, we can
reconnect speech and spatiality on yet another fundamental level. We can,
more specifically, better appreciate and understand the implications of the
prison as the exemplar of containing and controlling space); EDWARD SOJA, POSTMODERN
GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN SOCIAL CRJTICAL THEORY (1989).
268. Low & Lawrence-Zlliiiga, supra note 18, at 20 (quoting SETHA M. Low, ON THE PLAZA:
THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE AND CULTURE 128 (2000)).
269. See Rodman, supra note 244, at 203 ("[P]laces are socially constructed by the people who
live in them and know them; they are 'politicized, culturally relative, historically specific.'").
270. Crang & Thrift, supra note 238, at 2.
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tactical places we see all around us. Place is not merely a forum where
expression occurs; it is a manifestation or symbol of the speech that occurs
within. All places, including tactical ones, do more than contain bodies; they
hold and represent memories, emotions, and meanings. Further, as the next
section demonstrates, they communicate. A res, of course, does not do any
of these things.
4. The Dynamism of Place.-A final important insight from the spatial
tum in disciplines like geography, philosophy, and anthropology is that place
is not, as place-as-res indicates, inert and non-communicative. Place is
dynamic; it is itself an event. More than this, places can themselves actually
"express" or "communicate" something about the specific activities that they
permit, regulate, or suppress. As will become apparent, this is a critical
recognition in terms of the analysis of tactical places.
Jacques Derrida opined "that a building is more of a happening than a
thing." 271 Derrida's insight applies to places more generally. A place "is a
happening not just in the sense of the event of construction-significant and
necessary as this is-but in that, even as already constructed, it continues to
occur, to be 'the imminence of that which happens now. "'272 Put another
way, as Derrida and others have observed, 273 place gives or makes room for
things to occur. Architecture, then, is "a mode of spacing that makes a place
for the event."274
Here place's power resides not so much in its past-the events of its
production-as in its possibilities-the events that may take place there in
the future. Streets, sidewalks, and parks, for example, all make some room
for expressive events. But spatial tactics diminish the possibilities for
expressive happenings in these forums. As they partition, confine, and
segregate, spatial tactics render place inert, a non-happening, a non-event.
Tactical places like the Boston speech cage described in Part I can transform
public places from hopeful possibilities into more-or-less aborted events.
Places themselves are expressive happenings. As places happen, as they
are socially produced, speech is conveyed, amplified, muted, suppressed,
recalled, and altered. As it exists, a place expresses something. As it
becomes regulated, it may express something else. As one scholar has
suggested, places are "'multivocal'; they bespeak people's practices, their
history, their conflicts, their accomplishments." 275 As another scholar, an

271. CASEY, supra note 238, at 313.
272. Id (quoting Jacques Derrida, Point de Folie-Maintenant L 'Architecture, translated in
Kate Linker, AA FILES, Summer 1986, at 65, § 3).
273. See, e.g., AUGE, supra note 246, at 43 ("The place eommon to the ethnologist and its
indigenous inhabitants is in one sense (the sense of the Latin word invenire) an invention: it has
been discovered by those who claim it as their own.").
274. CASEY, supra note 238, at 313.
275. Rodman, supra note 244, at 214 (emphasis added). As one anthropologist suggested: "In
describing 'political events,' sites such as a courtroom, a Red Square, Whitehall, the White House
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anthropologist, observed: "[T]here is a condensation of values in particular
sites, and transactions that constitute the totality of social life may be
spatially mapped with specific sites expressing relatively durable structured
interests and related values." 276 Spatial dynamism conveys the "idea, well
established in geography, that places produce meaning and that meaning can
be grounded in place."277 Places, in other words, do not merely contain
speech and conduct-they communicate something about these things. It is
imperative that we ask what these places are communicating-with respect
to power, with respect to the speech and the speakers regulated in places, and
with respect to our commitment to public expression generally.
Place-as-res cannot encompass the complexities of expressive placeits variability, primacy, production, or dynamism. It cannot do so, first and
foremost, because place-as-res artificially separates speech and spatiality. As
the foregoing discussion demonstrates, speech and spatiality are intimately
associated; they intersect in various and complex ways. The state's power to
manage, control, and produce place substantially affects the speaker's ability
to convey her message. These insights apply to expressive place in general.
But they have special salience when considering tactical places which, as the
next section demonstrates, are uniquely troubling regulations of expressive
activity given their constructive and dynamic qualities.

B. Spatial Tactics As a "Benthamite Physics of Power"
Thus far, this Article has sought to distance place from res by
suggesting that place is distinctly different from mere property. It is, among
other things, variable, primary, constructed, and dynamic. This conception
casts regulation of the "where" of expression in a new light. It suggests a
need to look more closely at what spatial tactics accomplish, on whose
behalf, at whose expense, and with what effect on public expressive activity.
The idea that space can be used to control and discipline behavior is not,
of course, unique to the speech context. Spatiality has always been an
attractive organizing principle. Indeed, for as long as there have been
sovereign authorities, or any hierarchy of authority for that matter, place has
been used to control populations. 278 Officials have recognized the power of
place to distribute things like knowledge, wealth, access, and power.
As it happens, spatial tactics have a rich historical and intellectual
pedigree. Michel Foucault, who laced many of his works with important

can be interpreted as giving an emotional effect, comparable to the power of rhetoric, to the voice of
authority." Hilda Kuper, The Language of Sites in the Politics of Space, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 258.
276. Hilda Kuper, The Language of Sites in the Politics of Space, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 258.
277. Rodman, supra note 244, at 207.
278. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 195 (describing a seventeenth-century order that relied
upon "strict spatial partitioning" to combat the plague).
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insights about the power of place, noted a critical distinction between
architecture that was built to be seen and that which was built "to permit an
internal, articulated and detailed control."279 Foucault observed, for instance,
that those in power used place tactically to arrange populations: officials used
place to separate ailing communities from healthy ones, the sane from the
insane, and men of higher ranks from those oflower ranks. 280
Foucault, perhaps more than any other modern thinker, recognized the
ubiquity of spatial tactics. He observed these at work in, among other places,
military camps, schools (which he referred to as "pedagogical machines"),
prisons, factories, and asylums. 281 In the course of examining these and other
tactical "architectures," Foucault noted the degree of social control made
possible by these institutions' spatial character. He conceptualized the
architecture of these places as "a political 'technology' for working out the
concerns of government-that is, control and power over individualsthrough the spatial 'canalization' of everyday life."282
Foucault recognized that the power of place, from the state's
perspective, lay in its ability to segregate, discipline, surveil, and control that
which threatened the status quo. 283 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault's
examination of the history of the modern prison, he theorized that the state's
choice of architecture was intended to accomplish precisely these things. 284
The purpose of prisons was the creation of a "docile body" through
"enclosure and the organization of individuals in space."285 This docility was
accomplished, Foucault observed, principally through the application of
spatial arrangements and particular architectural features to the human
body.zs6
Foucault drew heavily upon Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon as a
paradigmatic example of the tactical use of place. 287 The Panopticon was

279. /d. at 172.
280. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (1976); FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at
145-47 (using as an example the Jesuit college model, itself based on the Roman legion, to show
how the place one occupies in a classification scheme defines rank); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS
AND CMLIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 3-13 (Richard Howard trans.,
Vintage Books 1988) (1965) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION] (discussing the
use of special houses to isolate lepers and the use of ships to distance the insane).
281. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 171-74 (discussing the spatial tactics of military
camps, schools, hospitals, and factories).
282. Low & Lawrence-ZUfi.iga, supra note 18, at 30 (quoting FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at
198).
283. See FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 170-74 (suggesting that the architectural design of
buildings by those in power is motivated by a need for surveillance).
284. See id. at 249-50 (describing how architects were directed to specifically design prisons to
further the goals of discipline and economy).
285. Denise L. Lawrence & Setha M. Low, The Built Environment and Spatial Form, 19 ANN.
REv. ANTHRO. 453, 485 (1990) (discussing Foucault's theory of architecture as a mechanism of
control).
286. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 143.
287. /d. at 200.
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perhaps the ultimate disciplinary architecture. Its unique architectural feature
consisted of an arrangement of cell-like spaces, each of which could be seen
only by a supervising authority, without the knowledge of the person being
observed. 288 Foucault referred to the Panopticon as a "cruel, ingenious
cage."289 He specifically noted the tactical feature of individual cells: "They
are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone,
perfectly individualized and constantly visible."290 The Panopticon, Foucault
said, represented "an architectural mechanism of control in its ideal form." 291
It was designed and built
to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control-to render
visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture
that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters,
to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects ofpower right
to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them. 292
Foucault noted that this tactic, or at least something like it, ultimately came
to serve a variety of disciplinary ends, among them the ready surveillance
and control of inmates, patients, and schoolchildren. 293
As the Panopticon exemplifies, spatial tactics like cages, pens, and
zones represent a precise and effective form of discipline and control.
Foucault noted the "progressive objectification and the ever more subtle
partitioning of individual behaviour," the "innumerable petty mechanisms"
of control and surveillance built into these sorts of architectures. 294 He also
provided the significant insight, insofar as the discussion of modem spatial
tactics is concerned, that these tactics operate with a subtlety that obscures
their substantial influence on behavior. Foucault's remarks might well be
applied to many of the tactics discussed in Part 1: "The disciplinary
institutions secreted a machinery of control that functioned like a microscope
of conduct; the fine, analytical divisions that they created formed around men
an apparatus of observation, recording and training." 295
Foucault
emphasized that this power was exercised not by any specific person or
institution, but by "a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights,
gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in
which individuals are caught up." 296 Significantly, no force or violence was
necessary; control was exercised through "the laws of optics and mechanics,

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 200-02.
Id. at 205.
ld. at 200.
Low & Lawrence-Zuiiiga, supra note 18, at 30.
FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 172 (emphasis added).
ld. at 200-01.
!d. at 173.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 202.
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according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, [and] degrees."297
It was exercised, in other words, spatially.
Through this geometric precision, this exercise of raw power through
place, officials discovered the effective technique of what Foucault referred
to as "binary division and branding," by which he meant a mode of
separating populations-the mad from the sane; the dangerous from the
harmless; the normal from the abnormal. 298 In separating populations in this
fashion, place communicated something about potential dangers or threats to
the community. In terms of the principle of spatial dynamism discussed in
the previous section, place expressed something about the status of those
within to those who remained on the outside. It symbolized status, power,
knowledge, and danger.
In addition, spatiality has been used throughout history "to make
differences in power perfectly recognizable." 299 In contexts in which spatial
tactics have been considered and applied, a common theme is the role spatial
relations play in the maintenance of power of one group over anotherguard-prisoner; schoolmaster-principal; factory boss-worker; health care
worker-patient; resident-outsider; ruler-ruled. 300 The "preferred spatial
modalities" represented by the architectures of these constructed places are
thus "expressions of specific distributions of power."301 These "calculated
distributions" of space and place are preferred by those in power because of
what they provide: order, control, surveillance, separation, and branding. 302
Tactical places are highly pragmatic architectures insofar as government
officials are concerned. As Foucault noted, the power of place has been used
to serve government's first need: to maintain order.303 In fact, Foucault
specifically addressed the central issue of this Article when he observed that

297. !d. at 177.
298. !d. at 199; see id. at 20 I ("Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of
power.").
299. Rabinow, supra note 20, at 353, 357-58.
Modem cultural geographers and
anthropologists have made the same point in their studies of spatial tactics in urban and suburban
geography. They have drawn on Foucault's insights in studying such phenomena as gated
communities, planned towns, and tourist villages. See, e.g., Low, supra note 20, at 387 (describing
recent research on spatial tactics).
300. See, e.g., Low, supra note 20, at 387 (suggesting that gated communities reinforce class
relations); Rabinow, supra note 20, at 353 (theorizing that urban planning supports "military
control" and helps to "establish a comprehensive order").
301. CASEY, supra note 238, at 298.
302. FOUCAULT,supra note 267, at 219.
303. Importantly, Foucault stated,
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all
events are recorded, ... in which power is exercised without division, according to a
continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located ... -all
this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism.
!d. at 197.
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through spatiality "an exact geometry" could be used by the state specifically
to combat disorder and dissent. 304 This, Foucault noted, is an especially
significant power for a government faced with mass phenomena like protests
and demonstrations. 305 He observed: "Whenever one is dealing with a
multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour
must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used." 306 Place, Foucault
observed, could be ordered to "neutralize the effects of counter-power," such
things as "agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions."307 Put
rather bluntly, spatial tactics render the bodies of agitators "docile" through
"enclosure and the organization of individuals in space." 308
For Foucault, however, power was not inherent in architecture. Rather,
he theorized that place has been an element of specific "political strategies"
at certain points in history. 309 IfFoucault is correct, then we would expect to
see a rise in spatial tactics as social and political conditions threaten the
status quo. The tactical places described in Part I fit this theory quite well.
So, too, does other evidence of this responsive or defensive use of spatial
tactics. For example, recent gated residential developments are a private
response to, among other things, increased crime and overcrowding. Like
spatial tactics generally, these places are constructs designed to further
interests in power, control, and separation. There is meaning in these
architectures. They are dynamic constructs. Indeed, as one anthropologist
suggested, "adding walls, gates, and guards produces a landscape that
encodes class relations and residential (race/class/ethnic/gender) segregation
more permanently in the built environment." 310 Others in the same field have
noted the rise of the "fortress city" in places like Los Angeles, where
architecture is utilized "as a strategy for controlling and patrolling the urban
poor that is made up of predominantly ethnic-Latino and Blackminorities."311 These architectures, as well, "facilitate avoidance, separation,
and surveillance." 312
Foucault's observations about place provide further support for
conceptualizing place not as mere res, but as an expressive manifestation of
power. Spatial tactics, in particular, are purposeful political technologies,
304. !d. at 174.
305. !d. at 219 ("[Discipline] must also master all the forces that are formed from the very
constitution of an organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that spring
from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts,
spontaneous organizations, coalitions-anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions.").
306. !d. at 205.
307. Id. at 219; see id. ("That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears
up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in
unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions.").
308. Low & Lawrence-ZUiiiga, supra note 18, at 30.
309. Low, supra note 20, at 355.
310. Id. at387.
311. !d. at 389.
312. Id. at391.
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designed and utilized in response to pressing social and political
circumstances. As Foucault observed, place acts as "a functional mechanism
that must improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid,
more effective, a design of subtle coercion."313 But the implications of
spatial tactics are far graver than this. They extend beyond rather discrete
places of power, like prisons and schools. Spatial tactics condition our most
public social places, some of the last remaining public areas in which we
encounter one another spontaneously and involuntarily. As they continue to
multiply, spatial tactics will recast the expressive topography.
A
"Benthamite physics of power" is being utilized to create what Foucault
called the "disciplinary society."314 Part IV addresses what approach courts
should take in light ofthis fuller appreciation of the power place has to affect
and control public discourse.
IV. Judicial Review of Spatial Tactics
This Part applies Part III's interdisciplinary insights regarding place to
generate proposals for judicial review of the spatial tactics described in Part
I. Spatial tactics currently enjoy the presumption of neutrality that applies to
place in general, and to other run mine spatial regulations. Accordingly, a
substantial portion of this Part is devoted to rebutting the notion that spatial
tactics are neutral regulations of the place where expression may occur. First
Amendment doctrine makes it very difficult to demonstrate purposeful
content discrimination. Thus, it may not be possible to demonstrate in any
particular case that the state has targeted a specific point of view. But this
does not mean that courts should continue to view spatial tactics as unrelated
to content. The perspective of place set forth in Part III reveals that tactical
places may properly be described as "content-correlated." 315 Given this
connection between speech and spatiality, there is sufficient justification for
applying what might be called "spatial skepticism" to the tactical use of
place. The state should be forced to justify the use of spatial tactics by
actually demonstrating the substantial interests it asserts. In addition, courts
should carefully review the lines the state has drawn, the "tailoring" of
tactical places, and confirm that the lines restrict no more speech than
necessary to serve the state's substantial interests. 316 Finally, given place's
primacy and dynamism, courts should be highly skeptical of arguments that
messages displaced or cut off by spatial tactics can simply be expressed

313. Id
314. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 209.
315. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 457 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
316. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that a
restriction based on content survives only upon a showing of necessity to serve a compelling
governmental interest combined with the least restrictive narrow tailoring).
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elsewhere. Whether alternative places are truly adequate should be a serious
part of the constitutional inquiry.
This proposal differs from the usual argument that time, place, and
manner regulations should generally be subject to greater scrutiny. First, it
applies only to spatial regulations. This is not to say that time and manner
cannot be manipulated; but the Article has demonstrated that place, in
particular tactical place, merits special consideration. Second, rather than
simply beginning from the mistaken premise of res or property, we now
know why place, and spatial tactics, are uniquely problematic. This will
inform the analysis of governmental neutrality, spatial tailoring, and the
purported existence of adequate alternative places for speech.
This Part concludes by considering the most likely objection to singling
out spatial tactics for special judicial attention: In an age when access to a
modem is all one needs to blog, vent, and otherwise express an opinion on
virtually any topic, why should courts spend energy and capital scrutinizing
real, physical places? There will undoubtedly be those who view concern
over access to streets, sidewalks, and parks as outdated. This Part, however,
offers several reasons why real public places remain critical to expressive
and associative freedoms.
A. Place and Neutrality

The presumption that place is a resource partitioned without regard to
expressive content stems from the conception of place-as-res.
This
misconception in tum causes courts to ignore how place is being utilized, by
whom, for what purposes, and with what effect on expressive and associative
rights. As Part Ill emphasized, spatial tactics do more than determine the
place where expression may occur. The government uses spatial tactics to
separate speakers from listeners, to subject speech to surveillance, and to
immobilize expression. Tactical places brand, even stigmatize, the speech,
and the speakers, within. Careful examination of these places reveals that
neither the constructive process, nor the tactical places themselves, are as
neutral as courts presume.
1. The "Calculated Distributions" of Spatial Tactics.-The
constitutional doctrine of place gives "place" a neutral veneer. A "forum" is
simply a locale where speech does or does not occur, depending upon the
property's objective characteristics and the state's objectively manifested
intent. "Time, place, and manner" regulations serve normatively neutral
interests like the maintenance of order, tranquility, and aesthetics. But as
Part Ill emphasized, scholars in many other disciplines have long questioned
the presumptive neutrality of place. 317 Anthropologists, for example, have
observed: "The assumed neutrality of [place] conceals its role in maintaining

317. See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.

632

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 84:581

the social system, inculcating particular ideologies and scripted
narratives." 318
The legal discipline generally does not grasp this important insight. It is
wholly missing from the constitutional doctrine of place. When courts see
cages and zones, indeed when they see any place, they do not see ideologies,
narratives, or messages. They see only legal res-public property managed
and partitioned by governmental trustees and proprietors. But in critical
terms, zones, cages, pens, and other tactical places are not brute facts. These
places are not given. As the concept of expressive place emphasizes, they
are made.
Spatial tactics do not merely distribute legal property; they allocate
power, wealth, access, and knowledge. They are, indeed, an aspect of the
"disciplinary society" Foucault lamented. 319 Our most basic geography,
public and private, is a manifestation of this. Large, open spaces are
becoming less prevalent in urban and suburban areas. Partly because space is
so scarce, every space is assigned a specific, approved use. We are routinely
told where to sit, stand, run, smoke, walk, drive, drink, play, and, of course,
speak. In addition to public regulations, private forces also routinely dictate
which places we can and cannot enter, which are off limits to those without
special permission to be there, and what we can do once we are in place. If
you do not have a first class ticket, you cannot sit in this place. If you do not
have a pass or membership, you are not privileged to enter this club or
community. These kinds of regulations and restrictions do not raise
constitutional concerns. Still, few would suggest that they are neutral. They
contribute to, and result in, expectations with regard to who and what
"belongs" where. Place, then, is always doing more than merely fashioning a
"neutral" system of access, behavior, or activity.
This insight applies with equal force to tactical places. Tactical places
are created for the same reason Foucault ascribed to architectures like
asylums, schools, and prisons-to discipline and control that which is
captured within. 320 Spatial tactics are designed to control expression. They
arise wherever offensive speech threatens the repose of listeners, or the
interests of government. Recent examples of this reactive use of spatial
tactics abound. Thus, just after protesters recently began to show up at
funerals to protest the Iraq War, legislators acted to impose speech zones. 321
After a protester began handing out literature facilitating challenges to court

318. Low & Lawrence-Zllfiiga, supra note 18, at 30; see also Patricia Yaeger, Introduction to
THE GEOGRAPHY OF IDENTITY I, 1-39 (Patricia Yaeger ed., 1996) (explaining that dominant
discourses regarding space discount its social effects and exploring new "cultural geography"
approaches to space that illustrate its political and social influence).
319. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 209.
320. See id. at 209.
321. See supra note I 0.

2006]

Speech and Spatial Tactics

633

citations, court officials banned expression within 100 feet of the
courthouse. 322 The pattern is typical.
One cannot, of course, leap directly from timing to the conclusion that
tactical places target specific points of view such that a more skeptical
judicial scrutiny is appropriate. As mentioned, it is very difficult to
demonstrate content targeting in general. 323 But courts ought to be aware of
this timing and recognize the reactive use of spatial tactics where it occurs.
More specifically, three aspects of tactical place undermine the neutrality
presumption: the architects of tactical places, the design elements of these
architectures, and the impact these places have on certain kinds of
expression.
24
It is important to recognize, as Foucault did/ that spatial tactics are
historically contingent. We should thus not be surprised at the recent use of
spatial tactics on the streets, at universities and abortion clinics, and in other
places where agitation is likely to occur. These tactics are targeted responses
to some of the most wrenching and divisive social and political issues of our
time, subjects like war, racism, and abortion. As Foucault theorized, spatial
tactics are political technologies used by government to counter mass
agitations, revolts, and other threats to the status quo. 325 In other words,
tactical places arc "calculated distributions" of place. 326 Those who use
spatial tactics in times of turmoil-the law enforcement and other officials
who are doing the calculating-are inherently biased against disruptive
expression. As discussed below, it may be appropriate to presume that city
planners, who design zoning schemes, are not biased as to any particular use
of property. 327 But this presumption does not apply to government officials
seeking to defuse tense expressive environments, particularly where the
tension relates specifically to governmental policies.
The architectural design elements of tactical places also undermine
these places' presumptive neutrality. Given their generally restrictive
characteristics and out-of-the-way locations, 328 it is difficult to see these
spaces as anything other than manifestations of a certain discomfort with and
bias against demonstrations, protests, and other agitations. The degree of
displacement is often itself troubling. Protesters may end up thousands of
feet from their intended audiences. For example, a recent ordinance banning

322. See supra note 161.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
324. See FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 218 ("The formation of the disciplinary society is
connected with a number of broad historical processes--economic, juridico-political, and, lastly,
scientific-of which it forms part.").
325. /d. at 141-49,215-16, 219.
326. /d. at 219.
327. See infra notes 375-382.
328. See, e.g., Low, supra note 20, at 387 ("[A]dding walls, gates, and guards produces a
landscape that encodes class relations and residential (race/class/ethnic/gender) segregation more
permanently in the built environment." (citation omitted)).
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protests within five thousand feet of any funeral service reportedly forced
protesters to demonstrate at the county sanitation department on the edge of
town. 329 As well, there are normative judgments lurking in the look and feel
of these new architectures. The Boston speech cage is the clearest example.
The jersey barriers, razor wire, mesh, and other design elements of the DZ's
architecture were designed with a particular type of expression in mind.
These features created a place in which it was apparent that little, if any,
dissent or agitation was supposed to occur. The DZ's architecture was
intentional; it anticipated and countered disruption at each specific tum, right
down to the application of a double-mesh barrier that inhibited conventiongoers' ability to see the protesters. 330 Sensing that little or no social or
expressive activity was possible in this space, no one entered it. 331 In the
end, then, the DZ was like the Panopticon: "an exemplary institution of state
power." 332 It did not merely regulate dissent; it actually suppressed it.
Although their architectures are less dramatic, other spatial tactics raise
similar concerns. As a geme, bubbles, pens, buffers, and zones do more than
inconvenience speakers by displacing them and their messages. Given the
primacy of place to expression, these calculated distributions ultimately
affect whether speech will reach its intended audience at all or will instead be
hidden, obscured, and avoided. A "free speech zone" that is the size of a
parking space or gazebo, and is located where few if any listeners will pass,
is specifically designed to minimize communication and interaction.
Spatial tactics are not entirely neutral with regard to speakers, or the
forms of speech protesters, demonstrators, and other "agitators" typically rely
upon. They routinely distort the vocality of place. They disparately, if not
exclusively, affect voices of agitation, dissent, and disruption. They are,
again, designed with these sorts of voices in mind. Demonstrations and other
expressive agitations are attacks on the status quo. Abortion and political
protests, even certain strains of hftteful speech, are expressive "revolts"
against current policies, circumstances, or conditions. Notably, disruption is
a significant aspect of the message these speakers seek to convey. 333 That
message is suppressed entirely when demonstrators, protesters, and other
social agitators are herded into pens, cages, gazebos, and speech zones. In
these places, protests and demonstrations become little more than staged
events, bland and neutered imitations of past social and political movements.
They are capitulations to order and the status quo, rather than challenges to
these things.
329. Tenn. County Bars Protests Near Funerals, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=J5985.
330. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
332. CASEY, supra note 238, at 309 (referring to the Panopticon as a space that is "stringently
controlled and internally transparent").
333. I am indebted to Brian Tamanaha for making this particular point in our discussions
regarding protest activity in the 1960s.
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Some examples help to highlight the content correlation of spatial
tactics. Suppose that if a speaker wishes to support the President, she may
stand near him, where she can be seen and heard. 334 This is, perhaps,
outright viewpoint discrimination. Less overtly or obviously, suppose that if,
however, she wishes to dissent with respect to certain administration policies,
she must do so at a baseball field a substantial distance from the event. 335 If a
speaker wishes to participate in a protest, she must stand within the provided
pens or barricades, where authorities and passers-by can see who is involved,
who is dissenting, and who is responsible for any disruption or
inconvenience. 336 If a speaker wants to protest with others at a national party
convention, she must commit to a cage provided for that purpose. 337 If you
wished to protest animal cruelty at the Cow Palace before 2004, you had to
stand within one of the 10-foot-by-20-foot "free speech" zones provided. 338
But if you were on the grounds for any purpose other than conducting a
"demonstration," then according to the institution's "free speech policy," you
were free to make your point wherever you chose. 339 In each instance, where
you are placed depends in substantial part on what you have to say.
Location depends, as well, on how you intend to convey your message.
Spatial tactics are designed to deal with specific modes of communication.
Mass agitations and other expressions that rely upon some combination of
speech and conduct are most likely to be affected by cages, pens, and other
tactical containers. There is no reason to doubt the wisdom of Professor
Kalven's observation that courts are inherently biased against what he called
"speech plus," which includes things like protests, demonstrations, marches,
and parades. 340 There is no reason to believe that local officials are not
similarly disposed toward these sorts of expressive "nuisances." Those
charged with maintaining order generally view negatively the distractions
and logistical problems associated with mass agitations and other forms of
protest. 341 The fact that this is a logical, common, and even understandable
reaction to disruptive speech is all the more reason to carefully scrutinize the
decisions of those in charge of designing tactical places.

334. See Bovard, supra note 42 (discussing the Bush administration's "quarantining" of
protesters in designated places distant from public events).
335. /d.
336. /d.
337. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61,
65--66 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (lst Cir.
2004).
338. Kuba v. A-1 Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down as
unconstitutional the restrictions limiting protestors to small, distant free speech zones).
339. /d. at 853.
340. See Kalven, supra note 26, at 22.
341. See, e.g., Steve Rubenstein & Kathleen Sullivan, S.F. Cops Grouse About What It's Like
on the Front Lines, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 22, 2003, at W5, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/03/22/MN283872.DTL
(describing
the
irritation that police felt during a riot).
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The effects of spatial tactics on certain speakers and messages are
magnified by the nature of the power they confer on the government.
Structures like the Boston speech cage, the university gazebo, campaign
"free speech" zones, and the 10-foot-by-20-foot speech zones outside the San
Francisco Cow Palace all make it faster and easier for the state to observe
speakers and to intervene when certain types of speech "go too far." More
than this, as Foucault observed, tactical places are designed "to permit an
internal, articulated and detailed control-to render visible those who are
inside it"; the zones and other architectures "operate to transform individuals:
to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the
effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter
them." 342 Examined in this light, the presumption that such tactics are not
designed to affect expressive content seems all the more implausible.
Consider spatial tactics' effects from the perspective of the speaker
ushered into a tactical place. From the speaker's point of view, spatial tactics
make speech far more burdensome, and thus far less appealing. Spatial
tactics, in other words, can have a substantial chilling effect on expression.
That chill is magnified by the fact that spatial tactics operate directly on the
body. This, among other things, is what makes place unique as a regulatory
tool. Unlike most time, place, and manner regulations, spatial tactics are
inherently coercive. 343 If a speaker knows that stepping outside designated
boundaries or zones can lead to punishment, she may be less inclined to step
into them in the first place. If by entering a pen or barricade she forfeits her
right to leave it, a protester may simply go home and skip the protest
altogether. Or, as at the Democratic National Convention in Boston, 344 the
architecture may itself be so unappealing, or unsafe, that speakers simply
refuse to enter. Note that these effects on participation are often obscured by
spatial tactics' purported purpose, which is presented as accommodation of
expression. 345 The state claims to set aside space for expression by providing
free speech zones. 346 Spatial tactics thus can appear to facilitate speech
while, in reality, suppressing and chilling it.

342. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 172 (emphasis added).
343. This is not to say that time and manner cannot be used to suppress speech. See, e.g., Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) ("In this case a permit is denied because some persons were
said to have found the sound annoying. In the next one a permit may be denied because some
people find the ideas annoying. Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. The
power of censorship in this type of ordinance reveals its vice."). But it is less likely, and often far
more obvious when this discrimination does occur. Time and manner regulations are not as visible
to potential listeners as spatial ones. Nor do they operate in the same physically coercive way as
zones, pens, and cages. The power to suppress expression by displacing it is both more subtle and
substantial than the power to do so by resort to either time or manner.
344. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat' I Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61, 65--66 (D. Mass. 2004), a.ff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
2004) (describing demonstration zones); see also supra notes 63, 80, 82 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part I.
346. See supra Part l.
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In sum, even if it is impossible to say that spatial tactics target particular
points of view or subject matters, it is at least clear that tactical places are not
entirely unrelated to the content of the expression they contain. Spatial
tactics are politically and historically contingent strategies for dealing with
particular types of disturbing and, from the state's perspective, threatening
expression. The character of these places can chill and suppress expression
on subjects like abortion, race, and the legitimacy of war. There is
substantial reason to doubt the presumption that spatial tactics are wholly
content-neutral. In these contexts, speech and spatiality are at least closely
related.
2. The "Message" ofTactical Place.-There is yet another perspective
from which to view, and question, the presumption of content neutrality
applied to tactical places: the perspective of those situated on the outside of
these places. We have already examined the effect that tactical places have
on speakers within. But recall that Part III's reconceptualization of place
emphasized that place is dynamic, even vocal. Courts should thus also be
interested in what these places "say" to listeners and viewers. If tactical
places do in fact "speak" or communicate some message to potential
audiences, if they actually say something about those they contain or their
messages, then the presumption of content neutrality will be further
undermined.
As noted, in a general sense, where one is "placed" says something
about relative status, knowledge, and power. 347 Place thus communicates
something about one's position in society. Things like permits, access to
special events, first class accommodations, and gated communities speak of
matters like wealth, influence, race, and ethnicity.
Spatial tactics operate in a similar manner with regard to protesters. As
Foucault observed with regard to asylums, prisons, and other institutions,
spatial tactics are a means of "separating and branding" individuals. 348 The
placement of persons tells a community, for example, who is sane, and who
is not; who is dangerous, and who is not. 349 Cages, pens, buffers, and zones
separate and brand speech and speakers considered offensive, disruptive, and
dangerous. Through the edifice of place, the state communicates something
about the nature and character of those inside to those who remain outside.
In these tactical places reside the disgruntled minority, the societal
"opposition." This is the tiny, agitated, displaced minority.
In fact, tactical places may communicate something even more
troubling than this. They may suggest that certain speakers be avoided

347. SeesupraPartill.
348. See FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 231 (noting that imprisoning individuals is a means of
"fixing them in space, classifYing them, ... [and] maintaining them in perfect visibility").
349. See id.; FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 280, at 68 (citing the
practice of confining the mentally ill and then putting them on public display).
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altogether. It is at least plausible to interpret many tactical places as a
statement to the effect that spatial tactics are needed to segregate these
speakers from others because they (and, by implication, their messages) are
dangerous, offensive, or otherwise objectionable to society. 350 This spatial
branding directly implicates the First Amendment's neutrality principle.
Viewed in this manner, tacticalplaces do more than separate speakers from
potential listeners (willing and unwilling alike); they stigmatize the speech
and the speakers they contain.
Viewing tactical places as active and communicative, rather than inert
and unrelated to expression, provides yet another basis for rejecting the
presumption that place is a neutral divider. Adding this insight to the
observations above regarding both the constructive process and expressive
effects of tactical places rebuts the presumption that these uses of place are,
like ordinary time, place, and manner restrictions, neutral with regard to
speakers and expressive content.
3. The "Correlation" of Spatiality and Speech Content.-Doctrinally,
to say that speech and spatiality are closely related or that spatial tactics
disparately impact certain speakers and messages does not provide sufficient
basis for applying strict judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that
any regulation "that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral," even where "it has an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others."351 So long as a regulation on the place of
expression is ''justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech," 352 it does not receive strict scrutiny. 353 The government will rarely,
if ever, fail to meet this standard when it utilizes spatial tactics. Spatial
tactics are typically said to serve interests in order and security.
Nonetheless, as noted, the intersection of speech and spatiality sets
spatial tactics apart from ordinary time, place, and manner regulations. Since
spatial taetics neatly fit neither the content-neutral nor the content-based
category, this Article suggests that courts consider spatial tactics "contentcorrelated" regulations of expression. The "content-correlated" label is
borrowed from the context of zoning of "adult" expression. 354 For some on

350. See Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Cordoning protesters
off in a free expression zone the size of a parking space, located over 200 feet from the entrance, far
from encouraging interaction with them, is more likely to give the impression to passers by that
these are people to be avoided.").
351. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
352. Clark v. Cmty. for Cr~ative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis added).
353. See id. at 312-13 (stating that "while regulations that tum on the content of the expression
are subjected to a strict form of judicial review, regulations that are aimed at matters other than
expression receive only a minimal level of scrutiny" (citation omitted)).
354. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 459 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (addressing the city's use of a zoning ordinance to limit the number of adult businesses
that could operate in a single building).
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the Court, 355 these zoning measures, which target establishments that display
sexually explicit content, occupy "a kind of limbo between full-blown,
content-based restrictions and regulations that apply without any reference to
the substance of what is said."356 As in that context, calling a tactical place
"content-correlated" would "not only describe it for what it is, but keep alert
to a risk of content-based regulation that it poses."357
The doctrinal and prescriptive implications of this label are explored
below. To the extent they have elaborated on the approach, the Justices who
subscribe to the "content-correlation" theory would subject the zoning of
adult speech to greater scrutiny than is currently applied to ordinary time,
place, and manner regulations. 358 These Justices would part company with
their colleagues by requiring, at least, an empirical demonstration of the
"secondary effects" the government claims to rely upon to justify its
zoning? 59 Whether they might require even more than this, perhaps in other
contexts where regulations are correlated with content, is uncertain.
ln considering what sort of scrutiny to apply, it is worth pointing out
that an upward adjustment would not be wholly novel insofar as spatial
tactics are concerned. As noted in Part I, the Court has subjected injunctive
abortion clinic "buffer zones" to a heightened standard of scrutiny. 360 Justice
Scalia sarcastically labeled this "intermediate-intermediate" scrutiny. 361 But
the Court's insight, which seems fundamentally sound, was that allowing
judges to enjoin speech spatially gives rise to a special risk of content
discrimination. 362 Taking into account the process whereby tactical places
are produced, however, there is no need to limit that insight to judges crafting
injunctions. Legislatures, law enforcement officials, and other administrators
can be just as intimately concerned with, and biased with respect to, certain
speakers and expressive content. 363
B. Spatial Skepticism
A time, place, and manner restriction must be content-neutral, serve
important governmental interests, be narrowly tailored to serve those
interests, and leave open ample alternative avenues or channels of

355. The "content-correlated" concept originates from the first part of a dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Souter, in which Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg joined. !d. at 453.
356. !d. at 457.
357. !d.
358. !d.
359. See id. (discussing the need for "empirical evidence" of secondary effects).
360. See supra subpart l(B).
361. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
362. See id. at 764 (majority opinion) ("Injunctions also carry greater risks of censorship and
discriminatory application than do general ordinances.").
363. See supra Part 1.
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communication. 364 The Court has significantly diminished the bite of this
standard. As to neutrality, the Court has held that any regulation that is
''justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech" will be
deemed content-neutral. 365 As noted, spatial regulations are nearly always
justified with reference to order, safety, and other content-neutral interests
that are considered important. 366 The Court has also taken pains to point out
that the tailoring of spatial regulations need not be the least restrictive or
intrusive means available to the government. 367 Finally, the adequacy of
spatial alternatives has never been a serious component of the time, place,
and manner analysis. Alternative places need only be theoretically, not
realistically, available to the speaker to be considered "ample."368 And in
terms of adequacy, places are treated as more or less fungible properties.
Speakers are not entitled to the most efficacious place. Whatever the spatial
regulation, it seems there is always an alternative space the speaker can
utilize to make his point.
This Article contends that courts confronting spatial tactics should be
far more aware of the power of place to distort and suppress expression. The
label that best captures this prescriptive proposal is spatial skepticism.
Spatial skepticism does not entail that spatial tactics can never be utilized or
that speakers have a right to speak anywhere they desire. Rather, the spatial
skepticism concept seeks to limit the application and scope of spatial tactics
to truly necessary contexts. It requires an inquiry into actual governmental
purpose, skeptical review of the lines and boundaries of tactical places, and

364. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ("The State
may [] enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral,
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.").
365. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis
added) (stating that time, place, and manner restrictions "are valid provided that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information"); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) (holding that any regulation "that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral"; this is so "even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others").
366. See, e.g., MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
Chicago's parade ordinance "justified without reference to the content of the marchers' speech"
because it required consideration of "whether the proposed activity will interfere with traffic,"
"whether the concentration of parade participants will prevent proper fire and police protection,"
and "the availability of police to protect participants from traffic hazards").
367. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 ("So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government's interest ... the regulation will not be invalid simply
because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some lessspeech-restrictive alternative.").
368. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986) (disagreeing
with the assertion that, because some of the suggested alternative locations for an adult theater were
"occupied by existing businesses," such that there was purportedly no '"commercially viable"'
space available, the alternative avenues of communication were inadequate).
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serious examination of any purported alternative places where it is contended
the expression may occur.
I. Place, Post-9/11.-As mentioned in the Introduetion, one of the
probable reasons for the rise of spatial tactics is the sense of foreboding that
has gripped the nation since the events of September II, 2001. This does not
account for all spatial tactics, of course. But it does account for some of the
more disturbing tactical places, like those that are now fixtures of political
protests in this country. Like so many other things, place has been affected
by the threat and fear of public violence.
There are general justifications, as noted above, for doubting spatial
neutrality. Courts should not merely accept any governmental justification.
They should demand some showing that the purpose is genuine, and that
using place is necessary. In this regard, there is one purpose that merits
special consideration. In the post-September 11 context, "security" from one
thing or another has become perhaps the most prominent governmental
rationale for spatial tactics. 369 Courts will encounter this justification with
increasing frequency.
There are two reasons for courts to be skeptical of this particular
justification. First, "security" is a far more malleable justification than those
the state has historically used to justify spatial regulations. Ensuring that two
parades do not collide, or that traffic continues to flow on a busy
thoroughfare, are rather mundane considerations regarding basic order.
Security is, by nature, a more complex, emotional, and politically charged
justification than these sorts of things. Because courts are by nature less
inclined to challenge this justifieation, "security" threatens a substantial
expansion of governmental control over public places. Second, although
spatial tactics do make us more secure (we are all "safer" insofar as those
who seek to disrupt and agitate are peuned and caged), this security comes at
a substantial price, namely a spatial regime premised upon "protection" from
expression that disturbs, agitates, and offends. Courts should be quite
sensitive to this tradeoff when assessing the security justification.
Security is, of course, a substantial state interest. But there is a
particular danger in our current social and political environment that courts
will too readily defer to this governmental justification. No court, after all,
wants to be responsible for violence (or worse) should there be a breach of
security. As the Boston speech cage demonstrates, courts are too willing to

369. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, l3 (lst Cir. 2004) (assessing the City
of Boston's interest in "maintain[ing] security at the [2004 Democratic National] Convention,"
which led to the creation of a demonstration zone for protesters), aff'g Coal. to Protest the
Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004); cf Bourgeois
v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1321 (lith Cir. 2004) (relating the purported governmental interest behind
a policy subjecting would-be protesters to magnetometer searches as the maintenance of public
safety and security, an interest the city claimed was bolstered by the "post-September ll
environment").
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defer to this rationale, even in the absence of any evidence to support it. 370
Protesters there were denied an opportunity to speak based upon reasoning
that came dangerously close to a form of "guilt by association." 371 The fact
that past protesters elsewhere had committed violent acts was treated as
reason enough to credit the government's assertion that these protesters
would do likewise. 372 This sort of reasoning only contributes to the growing
bias against and unease with dissident expression. Courts should make every
effort to avoid it.
This does not mean, however, that courts should second-guess every
security determination made by law enforcement officials. It means only that
where the presumption of neutrality no longer applies to spatial tactics, there
is room to question governmental justifications for their use. There should
be sufficient evidence of a threat to governmental interests to satisfy the
court that "security" is not being used as a pretext to affect or suppress
expression. This is a tricky empirical issue, since security relies in some
cases on projections of danger. It may be necessary to consider some of the
basis for the security justification in camera. In any event, the mere
incantation of "security" should not be treated as sufficient cause for locking
place down.
Judicial skepticism should not, as noted, be limited to justifications
based on security concerns. Spatial tactics represent a new generation of
place restriction. They are purposefully being used to defuse social and
political unrest. Given this trend, even ordinary justifications such as
maintenance of "traffic flow" should be more skeptically reviewed where
spatial tactics are used. Non-security-based justifications are generally
susceptible to the sort of demonstration being urged here. The danger of
pretextual resort to spatial tactics is sufficiently high that whatever the
justification, the state should be required to provide some evidence that its
interests and concerns are genuine.

2. Tailoring Space.- Courts appear to be as reluctant to scrutinize the
lines governments draw in constructing tactical places, their "tailoring," as
they are to assess justifications for them. This reluctance can probably be
traced in part to the historical deference given governmental zoning
370. The First Circuit recognized the need for sensitivity to the security justification in
reviewing the denial of protesters' request for injunctive relief during the 2004 Democratic National
Convention. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 13. The court stated, "Security is not a talisman that
the government may invoke to justifY any burden on speech (no matter how oppressive). Thus, the
question of narrow tailoring must be decided against the backdrop of the harms that a particular set
of security measures are designed to forfend." !d. Yet the First Circuit ultimately approved the
district court's decision, stating that "[t]he risks of violence and the dire consequences of that
violence seem more probable and more substantial than they were before 9/ II. When judges are
asked to assess these risks in the First Amendment balance, we must candidly acknowledge that
they may weigh more than they once did." !d. at 19.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 66-82.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 66-82.
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measures. 373 Contemporary Euclidian zoning, the sort that comprehensively
partitions and regulates land uses, began to appear in the early twentieth
century. 374 As a spatial modality, zoning "institutes a centralized, commandand-control style of land use regulation. It operates on the principle, 'a place
for everything, and everything in its place. "'375 Spatial tactics are, of course,
based upon a similar principle. To continue the analogy, spatial tactics might
be viewed as regulations of "expressive uses." Thus, just as officials
determine where certain business uses are appropriate, so too do they zone
speech where this "use" is most appropriate.
Despite the apparent similarity, the usual deference to governmental
line-drawing is inappropriate where spatial tactics are used. The power of
local officials to zone property for specific uses is well established. 376 From
the beginning, three principles have been thought to generally validate spatial
ordering through land use regulation.
First, zoning schemes were
comprehensive plans. 377 Through place, they implemented a common
community vision for cities and suburbs. 378 Thus, rather than target specific
uses, these plans were exercises of the police power in pursuit of the general
welfare. 379 Second, zoning relied. substantially on experts to conceptualize
and operationalize community plans. 380 The operative assumption was "that
the most important problems in land-use planning were not political but
scientific and technical."381 Architects, engineers, and other professionals
were expected to play a major role in developing zoning plans. 382 Arid these
professionals were presumed to be neutral with regard to specific uses. 383
Third, the increased specialization with regard to place contributed to a
reduction in the scope of judicial review applied to zoning plans. 384 Experts,
it was believed, should be flexibly permitted to manage changing
landscapes. 385 Judges are in no position to second-guess the basis for or the

373. See infra text accompanying notes 384--391.
374. Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 739 (2004); see also Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (upholding a comprehensive local zoning plan).
375. Claeys, supra note 374, at 739.
376. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First
Amendment, 64 B.U. L. REV. 767, 784--85 & nn.96-97 (1984) (stating that "[c]ommentators and
courts have heralded special use zoning as a sound method of protecting the general character of a
district through the grant of broad discretionary authority to local officials").
377. Claeys, supra note 374, at 740.
378. See id. at 750 ("The Progressives loathed the absence of a comprehensive plan.").
379. See id. at 750--51 (noting the "communitarian ideals" expressed through early zoning
plans).
380. See id. at 754 (noting that "the Progressives elevated experts and deprecated judges").
381. Id.
382. !d.
383. !d. at 754--55.
384. See id. at 755 (noting that "as social progress and expert planners rationalized land use,
they reduced the scope of judicial review").
385. Id.
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specifics of zoning decisions. 386 From the beginning, then, substantial
judicial deference has been applied to ordinary zoning measures.
These progressive principles--<:omprehensiveness, expertise, and
judicial deference-may counsel against interference with the regulation of
slaughterhouses and subdivisions. But courts should not apply them
unthinkingly to justify upholding spatial restrictions on the exercise of
fundamental expressive and associative rights. For one thing, spatial tactics
are not comprehensive plans. They are, once again, targeted responses to
social and political unrest. Nor, as has already been pointed out, are the
"architects" of tactical places neutral engineers, scientists, land planners, or
other land use experts. They are, by and large, officials with an inherent bias
for order and control over expression. 387 Hence it is no overstepping of
judicial bounds to question the tailoring applied to "expressive uses." The
rationale for judicial deference does not apply to spatial tactics.
Courts do sometimes invalidate the spatial choices government officials
make. But this typically occurs only where the speech zone is completely
disproportionate to the government's stated needs. As noted in Part I, the
2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles featured a 185-acre
"secured zone" around the stadium where the convention was to take
place. 388 The official demonstration area, or "free speech zone," offered to
protesters was located 260 yards from any participating delegate. 389 On its
face, that tactical place is not a tailored response to any problem. Nor is a
speech zone located 113 of a mile from the site of contention and the intended
audiences. But the challenge is for judges to steel themselves to look more
carefully at the lines drawn in even closer cases. Recognizing that these
decisions are necessarily matters of degree, or rather feet, courts should
nevertheless demand a persuasive showing that 50-, 75-, or 100-foot zones
truly burden no more speech than is necessary under the circumstances.

386. !d. at 756-57.
387. The Court has permitted deferential zoning with regard to sexually explicit adult
establishments. But it has done so on the implicit theory that the expression has little value. See
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (upholding Detroit zoning ordinances
that geographically dispersed "adult" theaters by prohibiting any adult theater from being located
within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area); id.
("society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude" than the interest in protecting political debate or other expression); see also City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429-43 (2002) (plurality opinion) (upholding a
zoning restriction on multiple-use "adult" establishments); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture
theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any "residential zone, single- or multiple-family
dwelling, church, park, or school"). Whatever deference may be due localities when they regulate
"low value" speech, this logic does not apply to the politically and socially significant expression
affected by spatial tactics.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
389. Serv. Employee lnt'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal.
2000); see also Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a free
speech policy that included designated zones).
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They should ask whether hard barricades and pens are truly necessary. If
these questions had been asked and answered honestly, it is difficult to
imagine that the Boston speech cage would have survived meaningful
judicial scrutiny.
Courts may be more inclined to scrutinize the boundaries and features
of tactical places if they understand how critical these things are to
expressive rights. Among other adverse effects, spatial tactics undermine the
historically venerable practice of intimate persuasion, practices like face-toface communication, and the distribution of literature. As institutional free
speech policies proliferate, speakers will continue to be drawn into out-ofthe-way places that render face-to-face communication impossible. And if
courts remain reluctant to engage questions of spatial tailoring, that is where
such speakers will remain.
There should be a presumption that any spatial tactic that prevents, or
substantially burdens, attempts at intimate persuasion fails the tailoring
standard. Of course, in situations like presidential appearances, that
presumption can be overcome by real concerns for the president's safety.
This does not mean presidents should receive a several-mile buffer, but
personal contact is, and must necessarily be, limited in that context. But
presidential access is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. In most
circumstances, the need for separation between speakers and listeners is far
less critical. Protesters outside auditoriums or conventions, in parks, and at
health clinics should be given the benefit of the presumption that spatial
tactics preventing intimate persuasion are unconstitutional. This may mean
that greater security is required at these places. And if greater security is not
sufficient to deal with a real and present danger, then spatial tactics may in
the end prove to be necessary. But they should be a last, rather than a first,
resort.
3. Spatial Adequacy-One of the things courts are supposed to
consider in assessing any spatial regulation is whether the regulation
"leave[s] open adequate alternative channels of communication."390 Spatial
skepticism would require that this inquiry, as well, be more rigorous in
situations where spatial tactics are used.
As current doctrine is interpreted and applied, it is the rare case that fails
this particular element of the time, place, and manner test. 391 This is so for
the quite obvious reason that in most cases, a regulation of place will not
wholly prevent a speaker from communicating elsewhere. If a speaker
cannot post signs here, for example, then he may still hand out literature over
there. The doctrine of place generally presumes that one place is as good as

390. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,76 (1981).
391. There are some examples, however. For a recent case finding a lack of adequate
alternative channels of communication in the context of a political protest, see Blair v. City of
Evansville, 361 F. Supp. 2d 846, 859 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
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the next. And speakers are not in any event entitled to the best place, but
only one that is "adequate." Consequently, courts spend little, if any, time
contemplating the relative expressive merits of alternative places.
As the avenues of communication have multiplied, it has only become
easier to gloss over this part of the analysis. Recall the First Circuit's
conclusion that the protesters subject to the speech cage in Boston could have
communicated their messages through the media assembled to cover the
national convention. 392 This is a dubious supposition to begin with; the
media typically cover the act of protest itself, which the cage prevented. But
the deeper problem with this analysis is that the court failed to appreciate the
significance of the place of expression to the protesters' intended message.
Being there, at that place, was in some sense critical to the protesters.
Massing with others to confront those who were attending the event was an
inextricable part of the message they sought to convey. The principles of
spatial primacy and dynamism, discussed in Part III, emphasize that the place
of expression is often critically associated with the expressive message. 393
As the First Circuit's analysis indicates, courts generally fail to take such
insights into account when examining place.
Aside from making this broad connection between speech and spatiality,
there are several specific things that courts should consider in deciding
whether ample or adequate space remains available to speakers. How
efficient is the alternative place relative to the place speakers have been
denied? How far is it from where the speakers originally wanted to be?
Does it entail additional costs, either in terms of time or money? How are its
specific characteristics or qualities likely to affect the planned social and
expressive activity? To what extent will the alternative space force speakers
to alter their message or their chosen method of communication? This is by
no means an exhaustive list. At a minimum, however, an adequacy
determination should not be made without considering the expense, location,
qualities, and expressive effects of the suggested alternative place or places.
C. Space As an "Index ofFreedom"
Questioning governmental purposes, ensuring minimal impact on
expressive and associative rights, and assessing spatial adequacy may, to
some, seem hardly worth the effort in this context. After all, these things are
being done merely to preserve discourse in public places that no longer seem
critical to expression. This is particularly so in light of the various
communication technologies modern speakers and listeners have at their
disposal. What difference does it make, some might say, that a protester

392. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004), aff'g Coal. to Protest
the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F.Supp 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004).
393. See discussion supra sections lii(A)(2), III(A)(4).
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cannot speak in the public park when she can blog or otherwise electronically
communicate her view to millions? This sort of reasoning underlies the First
Circuit's rationale urging the convention protesters to resort to media
coverage as an alternative to demonstrating in person. 394 Of course, the
Internet and other technologies have become critical media for the cheap,
rapid, and widespread exchange of ideas. But that does not mean that they
have supplanted real, physical places. Protection of access to the streets,
sidewalks, and parks remains critical to expressive and associative freedoms.
Despite advances in expressive technologies,. there are three broad
reasons for undertaking the suggested skeptical examination of spatial
tactics. The first relates to First Amendment theory broadly. The shrinking
and segmenting of public space that is open to expression undermines many
of the foundational premises of freedom of expression. Spatial techniques
produce a much smaller "marketplace of ideas," less space for selfgovernment, and less room for individual self-fulfillment. 395 We cannot selfgovern from inside cages, pens, and finely wrought zones. Public officials
who travel in bubbles and appear in dissent-free zones are increasingly
isol~ted and insulated from the public and its concerns. Moreover, place is a
critical component of the "safety valve" for our society's most offensive and
divisive expression. 396 But face-to-face confrontation is no longer viewed as
simply uncomfortable; it is being treated as presumptively insidious and
dangerous.
These theoretical concerns have now confronted a stark modem reality.
Public space is a rapidly diminishing resource. That is particularly true with
respect to public space that is open to expressive activity, the so-called public
forums. Main street has been replaced by the super-mall, where the First
Amendment generally does not apply. 397 We spend an increasing amount of
time today in places like airport terminals and subway systems, what some
scholars call "non-places."398 These places are not designed for social
interaction or expression. In these places, then, opportunities for significant
public debate and expression are few, and dwindling.

394. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 14 (noting that "[m]essages expressed beyond the firsthand sight and sound of the delegates nonetheless have a propensity to reach the delegates through
television, radio, the press, the internet, and other outlets"; thus, "viable alternative means existed to
enable protesters to communicate their messages to the delegates").
395. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND lTS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
15-16, 24-27 (1948) (advancing self-governance theory); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119 (1989) (discussing "marketplace" and other free speech
justifications).
396. See THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (arguing
that free speech leads to stability).
397. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520--21 (1976) (holding that labor picketers had no
right to demonstrate at a shopping center); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972)
(holding that Vietnam War protestors had no right to distribute handbills in a shopping center).
398. See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
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lf the requisite breathing space for expression is to be preserved, our
streets, sidewalks, and parks must remain free, open, and speech-facilitative.
What Harry Kalven, Jr. said in his seminal article on the public forum
remains true today:
[I]n an open democrac[y] ... the streets, the parks, and other public
places are an important facility for public discussion and political
process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can
commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such facilities
are made available is an index offreedom. 399
Spatial tactics, of course, preclude speakers from "commandeering" any
public places, including the streets and parks. lf the openness of public
places to expressive activity is in fact an "index of freedom," then we appear
as a society not to value public discourse much at all.
Second, on a more practical but no less important level, cyberspace, for
all of its innovations, simply cannot replace or imitate live protests and other
forms of expression. Anyone who has ever participated in an "online
protest" already knows this. As recent street protests around the world attest,
being there, and with others, are critical aspects of public dissent. 400 lf the
Internet is an effective substitute for this space, then why do we still see
people massing in public streets and squares where it and like technologies
are readily available? Part of the answer has to be that there is powerful
symbolism in gathering with others in public spaces. This does not depend
upon changing minds or any other notion of expressive effectiveness. The
event itself is cathartic, expressive, evocative, emotive, and meaningful to
those who participate. Speech on the Web shares few, if any, of these critical
characteristics.
Nor are cyberplaces more generally adequate substitutes for public
places like streets and parks. The history of civil protest is, in substantial
part, a history of places. The Mall, the Lincoln Memorial, Central Park,
Selma; these are integral aspects of our social and political heritage.
Cyberplaces do not retain or conjure lessons, meanings, or memories in a like
manner. Only real places are dynamic and expressive in this sense. ln sum,
as important as they are to expressive freedom, cyberplaces and other
metaphysieal places cannot alone ensure that "debate on public issues [will]
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.'-AOI

399. Kalven, supra note 26, at 11-12 (emphasis added).
400. See, e.g., Blair v. City of Evansville, 361 F. Supp. 2d 846, 856 (S.D. Ind. 2005)
(discussing the defendant's First Amendment argument regarding his right to be close enough to the
Vice President and the Vice President's supporters that they could hear his protests); Thomas Fuller,
Day of French Protests Draws Droves Nationwide, INT'L HERALD TR.l.B., Oct. 5, 2005, at 3
(reporting that "[h]undreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets across France on
Tuesday in 150 anti-government marches to protest privatization, stagnant wages and a Jaw that
makes it easier to Jay off employees at small companies").
401. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964) (emphasis added).
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Third, and finally, despite occasional suggestions to the contrary, the
public square lives. Harry Kalven, Jr. was writing at the height of the Civil
Rights movement, with special sensitivity to that particular movement's need
for public room or space. 402 Perhaps we cannot return to an era in which
citizens can "commandeer" the streets. There is real danger in that sort of
freedom, and there are certainly those who might abuse it. But we should be
careful not to tum the possibility of violence and confrontation, or the
existence of alternative modes of communication, into an excuse for
permitting the government to manipulate public places. Again evidence from
around the world demonstrates that real places like streets, parks, and public
squares still matter to social and political movements. The streets have been
central to recent protests in Colombia,403 China, 404 and Kyrgistan to name
only a few countries. 405 At home, the protests of the Iraq War, 406 the national
political conventions,407 .and the presidential inauguration408 all demonstrate
that these public places are still critical to social movements and political
culture.
If the public cannot commandeer the public square, then at least spatial
tactics should be limited and constrained to permit the effective use of these
places. Demonstrations depend for their effectiveness, including their media
coverage, upon reasonable proximity to intended audiences. 409 As past

402. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
403. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, By Millions, Colombians Take to Streets Against War, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1999, at 15 (reporting that "at least five million Colombians marched late last month in
more than 700 cities and towns to urge an end to [civil conflict] and related human rights abuses").
404. See, e.g., John Pomfret, A Buildup ofIrritation in Relations, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at
Al (noting that following the U.S. bombing of China's embassy in Yugoslavia, hundreds of
thousands of Chinese took to the streets to demonstrate against the United States).
405. See, e.g., Christopher Pala, Protests Force Leader to Flee in Kyrgyzstan, N.Y. nMEs,
Mar. 25, 2005, at Al (stating that "[p]rotesters alleging corruption, repression and electoral fraud
forced the longtime president of this central Asian country to flee his palace").
406. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, In D.C., a Diverse Mix Rouses War Protest, WASH. POST,
Oct; 26, 2003, at A8 (describing anti-lraq war protests that took place in more than two dozen U.S.
cities on the previous day, including one in Washington, D.C. that proceeded "along a route that
ringed the Washington Monument, the White House and the Justice Department").
407. See, e.g., Serv. Employee lnt'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968,
975 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that protestors of the 2000 Democratic National Convention were
entitled to use the surrounding streets and sidewalks for public demonstrations, marches, and
speeches).
408. See Paulson, supra note 36 (noting that protesters were issued permits to demonstrate only
in designated areas along the parade route during the 2000 presidential inauguration).
409. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests-section II, 29
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1163, 1206 ri.l09 (1996) ("Proximity allows the speaker to establish both aural
and visual contact with the listener in a personal manner. This facilitates and amplifies the
transmission of the message being conveyed by erihancing the dramatic impact of expression and
demonstrating the intensity of the speaker's beliefs."); Mark S. Nadel, Customized News Services
and Extremist Enclaves in Republic.com, 54 STAN. L. REv. 831, 871 (2002) (book review) ("Today,
a public forum's role as a mass media channel for speakers is primarily as a location for staging
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demonstrations have taught, confrontation, disruption, and a degree of
spontaneity are critical aspects of these fundamental collective rights. 410 It is
impossible to imagine the 1960s Civil Rights movement or the era of
Vietnam protests-two periods indelibly etched on our collective national
psyche-occurring from within pens, cages, bubbles, and "free speech
zones." Unrestrained protests can teach volumes; demonstrations in tightly
constructed cages, by contrast, convey only how little value we currently
place on protest and dissent.
In our own time, spatial tactics are making it impossible for history to
repeat itself. A demonstration on the West Side Highway, for example, is
simply not an adequate substitute for one that abuts the site of the Republican
National Convention.411 A cage that makes it impossible for protesters to be
seen or heard, or for their presence to be felt, does not provide a
constitutionally adequate place for expression. Barricades create docile
bodies, to be sure, but at the expense of the spontaneity and creativity that
make protest an effective mode of expression. As one commentator put it:
"The 'Huddle on Washington' just doesn't have the same ring to it.'"' 12 A
social or political movement must, after all, have some freedom to move.
Our expressive topography is increasingly inhospitable to the very
speech that merits the greatest protection, namely speech on matters of public
concern, including political speech. The speech that takes place in the public
streets and parks is very often uncomfortable for many to witness. But it is a
truism that the measure of a society's freedom is its ability and willingness to
embrace unpopular behaviors and attitudes. By that measure, spatial tactics
speak volumes regarding this society's current commitment to freedom of
expression. To return to Kalven once more:
Among the many hallmarks of an open society, surely one must be
that not every group of people on the streets is a mob, and another that
its streets time out of mind have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. 413

presentations, including protests and rallies, intended to reach mass audiences via conventional
mass media.").
410. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (asserting that "timing is of the essence" with regard to political protest because "when
an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at
all"); Cheh, supra note 35, at 62 (offering examples in support of the assertion that
"[c]onfrontational and troublesome protests and demonstrations, particularly those held in
Washington D.C., have had a direct effect on the great public questions of the day").
411. For an account of this real-life forum substitution, see Diane Cardwell, Protesters Accept a
Stage Distant from G.O.P. Ears, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at B3, which reported that a large rally
that protesters had originally hoped to hold in Central Park had been moved to a site on the West
Side Highway.
412. Paulson, supra note 36.
413. Kalven, supra note 26, at 32 (quotations omitted).
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We . would do well to keep such sentiments in mind in the current
century, and in centuries to come.
V.

Conclusion

Streets, sidewalks, and other public spaces are increasingly subject to
spatial tactics, the utilization of space for social and political control. As
Harry Kalven, Jr. wrote forty years ago: "[T]he generosity and empathy with
which such facilities are made available is an index of freedom.'>4 14 That
index is presently at a low point; speakers are now routinely confined to
cages, zones, pens, and other spatial architectures. This Article has argued
that place in general, and spatial tactics in particular, are not as neutral as
current speech doctrine indicates. To decide where expression takes place is
to choose a distribution of power and knowledge, to make normative
judgments about what speech should be seen and heard and what speech
should be segregated and avoided. Tactical places separate and brand
speakers; communicate to the public that dissent, and dissenters, are
dangerous and are to be avoided; facilitate avoidance of unpopular or
offensive speech; inhibit movement and associative expression; and allow for
tight surveillance of unpopular speech and speakers.
This Article argues that we must finally abandon the conception of
place-as-res. lt proposes that courts adopt a reconceptualization of place as
distinctly expressive-as variable, primary to speech, constructed, and
dynamic. This is a critical first step to reconnecting speech and spatiality.
Based upon this reconceptualization, this Article advocates what it calls
spatial skepticism, essentially a closer review of spatial tactics and tactical
places. Armed with the knowledge of what place actually is, courts should
no longer blindly accept a state's proffered justifications for resorting to
spatial tactics. Nor should courts simply defer to the lines, boundaries, and
architectural features the state imposes, or accept unquestioningly the
"adequacy" of the places the state offers as alternative locations for
expressive activity. The state, in other words, should henceforth be forced to
justify the expressive topography it is mapping.

414. !d. at 12.

